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Abstract 
Over the past two decades a variety of banking system rescue approaches have been used, 
including in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 2010 
European debt crisis. By analysing the resolution of these crises as well as the approach to 
addressing bad loans in the People’s Republic of China, this paper provides a new 
perspective on the common belief that bailouts are invariably harmful to public funds or 
excessively conducive to moral hazard. Depending on the form of bailout, bank restructuring, 
and fiscal backstop, resolutions can be an effective means to restore a banking system. This 
paper argues that in a systemic financial crisis, a combination of balance sheet restructuring 
and the use of asset management companies to deal with non-performing loans is often the 
best choice. However, a fully-fledged resolution that triggers the bail-in procedure remains 
the best approach for non-systemically important financial institution failures which take 
place outside of systemic crises, namely when the failure is idiosyncratic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Banking crises are most frequently caused by high leverage ratios that result in stressed 
balance sheets when the economic cycle contracts—from a market-correction or adverse 
macroeconomic developments.
1
 The legacy of unsustainable leverage is large quantities of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) and severe debt overhang.
2
 Normally, during the expansionary 
phase of the economic cycle, credit standards are relaxed, increasing the capacity of 
borrowers to access credit, stimulating demand for financial assets and, in some cases, real 
investment. Consumer and business confidence rises, encouraging more investors to enter the 
market which further fuels asset price growth and increased leverage.  
When asset prices increase above the notion of fundamental value, the central bank/regulator 
may intervene to discourage demand for further borrowing by tightening monetary policy, 
raising interest rates, and/or introducing countercyclical prudential measures, for example 
altering loan to value ratios.
3
 When borrowers’ capacity to support the market abates and 
default risk increases, banks reduce their exposure by tightening credit standards, raising the 
cost of credit. Borrowers with high credit default risk are forced to de-lever by selling assets, 
which places downward pressure on asset prices that can possibly trigger fire-sales.
4
  
If the volume of asset (i.e. collateral) sales is widespread, simultaneous, and heavily 
discounted, this can trigger an economic crisis,
5
 and a spike in bank loan defaults. Acute 
credit imbalances develop during the economic cycle, as described by Hyman Minsky in the 
‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’.6 As the credit cycle contracts and the economic cycle 
                                                          
1
 John Geanakoplos, ‘Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle’, (2010) FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review 101-131; John Geanakoplos, ‘The Leverage Cycle’ in Daron Acemoglu, Kenneth Rogoff, and 
Michael Woodford, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010), pp. 1–65. 
2
 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential 
Perspective’, (October 2015) Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 849: available at 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/146977/1/840973446.pdf.  
3
 Stijn Claessens, ‘An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools’, (December 2014) IMF WP/14/214: available 
at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14214.pdf   
4
 See: Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew Crocket, Charles Goodhart, Avinash D. Persaud, and Hyun Shin, ‘The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’, (January 2009) Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, 5 
et seq. 
5
 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore, ‘Credit Cycles’, (April 1997) 105 Journal of Political Economy 2, 211–
248. Naturally, causality is reciprocal.  
6
 Hyman P. Minsky, ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’, (1992) Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 
Working Paper No. 74; and ‘Financial Instability Revisited: The Economics of Disaster— Fundamental 
Reappraisal of the Discount Mechanism’, (1970) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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enters into the recessionary phase, banks have to manage a large number of non-performing 
or partially performing assets. Bank balance sheets can become severely stressed, giving rise 
to solvency vulnerabilities. When a number of banks share liquidity and/or solvency 
vulnerabilities, the risk of a systemic banking crisis is high.  
Identifying distressed assets and effecting an efficient off-balance sheet transfer to clean up 
banks’ loan books, thereby enabling new lending, can be crucial for restoring the stability of 
the banking system. This also depends on the level of NPLs banks carry on their balance 
sheets. Naturally, regulatory authorities have a duty to prevent an accumulation of NPLs, 
which is not entirely independent of the size of capital write-offs that NPL losses may realise. 
Preventative measures include high levels of loan pre-provisioning (boosted by the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standard 9), high loan-to-income and loan-to-value 
ratios, macro-prudential capital buffers, and more recently bail-in tools and bail-able capital 
instruments. Further NPL prudential measures include debt service coverage ratios, NPL 
ratios, NPLs to total loans, and NPL volumes.
7
 Arguably, experience from recent banking 
crises suggests that among the most successful approaches to stabilise a banking system 
characterised by high ratios of NPLs is to realise a legal transfer to an asset management 
company (AMC).  
This paper analyses three major banking crises over the past two decades to explain, on the 
basis of evidence, why restructuring systemic banks’ balance sheets is the most effective 
approach when bailing-out a banking system. Historical examples are drawn from countries 
most affected by the banking crises in Asia, the United States and Europe. This paper is in six 
sections: Following this Introduction, Section II discusses the issues concerning the definition 
and regulatory treatment of NPLs, and critically examines the key aspects of international and 
European Union (EU) bank resolution standards. This section debates the causes and 
consequences of NPLs from an economic analysis perspective. A distinction is drawn 
between NPLs accumulating from institutional weaknesses, including flawed lending policies 
and underwriting standards, and NPLs that are more clearly rooted in macroeconomic 
developments. Section III analyses the effects of the Asian financial crisis on the banking 
systems of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the use of AMCs in the People’s 
Republic of China (China). Section IV examines three bank rescue case studies: the bail-outs 
of UBS, RBS, and Citigroup respectively; during the global financial crisis (GFC) to evaluate 
                                                          
7
 This paper uses NPL ratios, primarily sourced from the World Bank, to identify distressed assets. 
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the effectiveness of the approaches in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Section V examines the approaches to resolve the ongoing banking crises in Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and Greece, and obstacles relating to NPL resolution. Section VI draws on the 
earlier analysis to firstly provide a prescriptive summary of our findings and secondly to offer 
normative guidance on the most effective approaches to rescue a banking system. 
 
II. IDENTIFICATION, TREATMENT, CAUSES, AND  
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS 
In considering resolution of banking crises, the first step is obviously prevention. However, 
experience has shown very clearly that prevention is not sufficient; it is also necessary to 
have in place a system designed to address banking and financial problems of varying sorts 
prior to the actual onset of such issues. Significant work has been done over the past twenty 
years in this respect.
8
 There are however varying views on the most effective strategic 
approach to addressing resolution of problems particularly in systemically important financial 
institutions.
9
 While it initially might seem obvious, definition of non-performing assets 
remains a significant issue. 
A. Non-performing Loans: Definition, Regulatory Issues, and Accounting 
Treatments  
Attempts to systemise a definition of NPLs are problematic because loan non-performance 
varies, and there are different forms of delinquent loans. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) defines a non-performing exposure (NPE) based on delinquency 
status—loan and debt securities that are 90 days past due or the unlikeliness of repayment, 
including: (i) exposures defaulted under the Basel framework, (ii) exposures impaired 
according to the applicable accounting framework, and (iii) all other exposures that are more 
than 90 days due or evidence that the full payment of principal and interest without 
realisation of collateral is unlikely, regardless of the number of days past due.
10
 This is 
                                                          
8
 See Rolf Weber, Douglas Arner, Evan Gibson and Simone Baumann, “Addressing Systemic Risk: Financial 
Regulatory Design”, (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 149. 
9
 See Douglas Arner and Joseph Norton, “Building a Framework to Address Failure of Complex Global 
Financial Institutions”, 39 Hong Kong Law Journal 95, 95-128 (2009). 
10
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Guidelines Prudential treatment of problem assets – definitions of 
non-performing exposures and forbearance,” (15 July 2016) Consultative Document, 1 and 8. 
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similar to definition used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—a default on principle 
and interest that lasts more than 90 days.
11
 Comparatively the BCBS definition is wider, 
because not all definitions capture debt securities.
12
 
Adopting internationally-accepted NPE/NPL classifications promotes confidence in the 
recognition of a bank’s balance sheet financial position, credit risks and the ability to achieve 
solvency.
13
 NPL classifications and measures are the most universal methods of identifying 
credit exposures. Numerous flaws in this methodology have been identified by the BCBS, 
notably the NPL definition is predominately determined by ex-post collectability—i.e., 90 
days past due. Furthermore, jurisdictions rarely share the same definition of NPLs.
14
 
Arguably this is because each jurisdiction’s banking system is unique, necessitating a number 
of stylised qualitative factors to measure NPLs. Until the BCBS guidelines on the prudential 
treatment of problem assets are universally adopted, NPL measures remain the only viable 
means to measure banks’ balance sheet financial position and credit risk exposure to problem 
or distressed assets.  
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 – ‘Financial Instruments’ provides 
internationally accepted standard for the accounting treatment for impaired assets. This 
treatment centres on forward-looking or expected credit losses (ECLs)—the timing of 
recording a loan loss provision (e.g., provision for doubtful debts), and when to move 
NPLs/NPEs off-balance sheet. ECL accounting treatment comprises quantitative and 
qualitative measures.
15
 ECLs account for performing loans when credit risk increases, which 
affect bank balance sheets when credit growth and credit risk expectations increase—i.e., at 
the top of the credit cycle heading into a credit contraction.  
IFRS 9 can impact capital buffers and possibly trigger bail-in debt instruments—for example 
contingent convertibles (CoCos). As NPL recognition under IFRS 9 is subject to banks’ 
                                                          
11
 The term ‘non-performing loans’ is not uniform among jurisdictions. This paper adopts the IMF definition: 
Adriaan M. Bloem and Russel Freeman, ‘The Treatment of Nonperforming Loans’, (June 2005) IMF, Issue 
Paper Prepared for the July 2005 Meeting of the Advisory Expert Panel, 8. 
12
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Guidelines Prudential treatment of problem assets – definitions of 
non-performing exposures and forbearance,” (15 July 2016) Consultative Document, 6. 
13
 World Bank, ‘Bank Loan Classification and Provisioning Practices in Selected Developed and Emerging 
Countries’, (2002) A Survey of Current Practices in Countries Represented on the Basel Core Principles 
Liaison Group, 3. 
14
 David Bholat, Rosa Lastra, Sheri Markose, Andrea Miglionico, and Kallol Sen, ‘Non-performing Loans: 
Regulatory and Accounting Treatments of Assets’, (April 2016) Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 594, 
22 and 23. 
15
 Ibid 36 and 37. 
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discretion, there is an incentive to procrastinate to avoid bail-in triggering events.
16
 The IMF 
recognises this impediment and recommends incentives to accelerate the transfer of 
NPLs/NPEs off-balance sheet.
17
 It is unclear how this will materialise in practice. For 
developed markets, IFRS 9 will commence in 1 January 2018, and for developing markets 
(e.g., Asia) from 1 January 2025 or sooner if the threshold is met.  
In April 2016 the BCBS released the ‘Prudential treatment of problem assets – definitions of 
non-performing exposures and forbearance’, in which it seeks to harmonise NPE definitions 
and measures to promote consistent bank reporting and disclosures.
18
 This includes 
quantitative measures such as delinquency status (i.e., 90 days past due) or the unlikeliness of 
payment of loans and debt securities. The proposed definitions complement asset 
categorisation in existing accounting and regulatory frameworks.
19
 Rules are being drafted to 
determine uniform criteria to upgrade an exposure from non-performing to performing and 
the interaction between non-performing status and forbearance.
20
  
This is complemented by ‘Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions’. The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) issued accounting provisions which centre on timing when a 
credit loss and therefore a NPL/NPE is recorded. To overcome the problem where IFRS 9 
NPL/NPE recognition is subject to banks’ discretion, the BCBS proposes that banks follow 
sound credit risk management practices, namely early recognition of credit losses.
21
 The 
BCBS is considering linking the accounting provisions with banks’ Basel III capital 
requirements to harmonise accounting approaches—any shortfalls are to be deducted from 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1).
22
  
Accounting classifications are important as NPLs/NPEs shown at fair value affect the level of 
loan loss provisions and when NPLs/NPEs are recorded or written-off. Valuations are pro-
cyclical because they tend to be overstated during times of rapid economic expansion and 
                                                          
16
 IMF, ‘Ireland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2010 Extended Arrangement’, (January 
2015) IMF Country Report No. 15/20, 52. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 BCBS, ‘Prudential Treatment of problem assets - definitions of non-performing exposures and forbearance – 
consultative document’, (April 2016): available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d367.htm (visited on 25 
October 2016).  
19
 BCBS, ‘Prudential Treatment of problem assets - definitions of non-performing exposures and forbearance – 
consultative document’, (April 2016): available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d367.htm (visited on 25 
October 2016).  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Bank of International Settlements, ‘Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions’, (11 October 2016) 
Consultative Document, 1. 
22
 Ibid. 2. 
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understated in downturns.
23
 Thus the ECL seeks to smooth valuation volatility and strengthen 
banks’ capital position. An ECL standard is currently being implemented in the EU. 
The definition of an NPE in the BCBS prudential treatment of problem assets is incongruent 
with the definition of ECL in the BIS regulatory treatment of accounting provisions. NPEs 
are defined using the incurred-loss model (i.e., 90 days past due—an ex-post measure) 
whereas the ECL definition disregards 90 days past due because it is an ex-ante measure 
based on IFRS 9. To overcome this anomaly, the prudential treatment of problem assets and 
accounting provisions require harmonisation.  
In July 2015, the BCBS released ‘Guidelines for identifying and dealing with weak banks’ 
which focuses on resolution powers and tools, for example the management of impaired 
assets. Guidance is given on asset quality, namely negotiating new agreements with debtors 
(e.g., loan maturity extensions, interest rate reductions, partial debt forgiveness, and debt to 
equity swaps), taking possession of collateral, writing-off long-term NPLs, and selling assets 
then transferring to a special purpose debt management vehicle (e.g., AMC).
24
 Asset recovery 
is economic, fair, expeditious, and on a net present value basis.
25
 Methods for selling 
impaired assets include portfolio sales, asset-by-asset sales, securitisation, or sales to a 
restructuring entity.
26
 Reasons for transferring assets off-balance sheet are to render balance 
sheet and bank viability, for management to focus on problems and strategies, and for 
specialists (e.g., AMCs) to maximise recovery value.
27
  
B. International Approaches and Standards: Systemic Bank Resolution and Moral 
Hazard 
Banks facing a large number of NPLs could experience an extreme capital reduction. Capital 
write-offs may push the ailing bank into resolution. Most modern resolution regimes, 
analogous to Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) 28  and the EU’s Bank 
                                                          
23
 David Bholat, Rosa Lastra, Sheri Markose, Andrea Miglionico, and Kallol Sen, ‘Non-performing loans: 
regulatory and accounting treatments of assets’, (April 2016) Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 594, 
21. 
24
 BCBS, ‘Guidelines for identifying and dealing with weak banks’, (July 2015) Bank for International 
Settlements, 38. 
25
 Ibid. 49. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Act (Pub L 111–203, 
HR 4173). 
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Recovery and Resolution Directive
29
 (BRRD) target, beyond the objective of orderly bank 
failure and avoidance of systemic disruption, the very well documented too-big-to-fail 
subsidy,
30
 and adverse selection by bank management and shareholders (i.e., selection of 
riskier assets)
31
 which is the content of moral hazard that is associated with public bailouts. 
Normally a bail-out extends to senior unsecured creditors who remain unaffected by the cost 
of bank failures, which are thus borne by the taxpayer.
32
 For this reason, public bail-outs are 
regarded as both an important source of bank management excessive risk-taking (moral 
hazard) and of weak monitoring by creditors. There is a wide belief that by eliminating public 
assistance in resolution or by setting high very barriers to entry, contemporary resolution 
regimes have overcome moral hazard. This paper demonstrates below, that unlike the US and 
to a large extent the EU BRRD, international bank resolution and NPL restructuring 
standards take less of a doctrinal approach by providing a pragmatic view of the problem and 
of the role of (temporary) public funding to resolve high NPL ratios. 
On 4 November 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) released the ‘Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (“Key Attributes”) which state that 
an effective resolution regime: 
is to make feasible the resolution of financial institutions without severe 
systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss, while protecting 
vital economic functions through mechanisms which make it possible for 
                                                          
29
 Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms OJ L 2014 173/190 or BRRD. 
30
 Joao A. C. Santos, ‘Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-To-Fail” Subsidy’, (December 
2014) 20 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 29; Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder Di 
Mauro, ‘Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for systemically Important Financial Institutions’, (2011) IMF 
Working Paper WP/12/128; Zan Li, Shisheng Qu, and Jing Zhang, ‘Quantifying the Value of Implicit 
Government Guarantees for Large Financial Institutions’, (2011) Moody’s Analytics Quantitative Research 
Group; Donald P. Morgan and Kevin J. Stiroh, ‘Too Big To Fail after All These Years’, (September 2005) 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, Staff Report no. 220. 
31
 Gara Alfonso, Joao Santos, and James Traina, ‘Do “Too Big To Fail” Banks Take on More Risk?’, (2014) 20 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 2; Luis Brandao Marques, Ricardo Correa, and 
Horacio Sapriza, ‘International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector’, 
(2013) IMF Working Paper 13/94; Blaise Gadanetz, Kostas Tsatsaronis, and Yener Altunbas, ‘Spoilt and Lazy: 
The Impact of State Support on Bank Behavior in the International Loan Market’, (2012) 8 International 
Journal of Central Banking 121. 
32
 Yet bail-out costs may not be accurately measured unless the cost of the alternative—instability—is also 
counted. See: Mathias Dewatripont, ‘European Banking: Bail-out, Bail-in and State Aid Control’, (2014) 34 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation 37. Moreover, as was the case with the US Troubled Asset 
Relief Programme, the costs of public intervention may be recovered in the long-term making the calculation of 
the costs of public bail-outs even more complex. 
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shareholders and unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses in a 
manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation.
33
 
 
The options to resolve an unviable bank are ‘stabilisation’ and ‘liquidation’ which are 
underpinned by resolution powers including: (i) removing and replacing senior management 
and directors; (ii) appointing an administrator; (iii) powers to terminate, continue, or assign 
contracts; (iv) the power to purchase or sell assets; (v) writing down debt and restructuring 
bank operations; (vi) continuity of essential services; (vii) overriding shareholder rights to 
facilitate a merger, take-over, sale of business operations, recapitalisation, or other measures 
to restructure or dispose of the bank’s business, liabilities or assets; (viii) establishing a 
separate bridge institution or asset management vehicle to transfer run-down NPLs or 
difficult to value assets; (ix) carry out a bail-in within resolution; (x) impose a moratorium to 
suspend payments to unsecured creditors and customers; and (xi) effective an orderly 
liquidation.
34
 These resolution powers enable the sale and transfer of NPLs to an AMC. This 
includes the power to transfer assets and liabilities to AMCs which does not require the 
consent of interested parties or creditors, nor constitute a contractual default or termination 
event.
35
  
 
When bail-in tools are used to transfer impaired assets, the resolution authority’s powers 
include: (i) a write-down that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation, equity, or other 
instruments to absorb losses; (ii) converting into equity or ‘bank under resolution’ ownership 
instruments that respect the hierarchy of claims in liquidation; and (iii) upon entry into 
resolution, convert or write-down any contingent convertible (e.g. CoCos) or contractual bail-
in instruments where terms have not been triggered.
36
 
On 19 October 2016, the FSB released ‘Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the 
Banking Sector’ which sets out a bank resolution framework in the context of the Key 
Attributes. The methodology focuses on the resolution regime for global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs). Preconditions for G-SIB resolution effectiveness include: (i) a 
                                                          
33
 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,’ (4 
November 2011), 3. 
34
 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,’ (4 
November 2011), 7 and 8. 
35
 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,’ (4 
November 2011), 8. 
36
 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,’ (4 
November 2011), 9. 
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well-established framework for financial stability, surveillance, and policy formulation; (ii) 
an effective system of supervision, regulation, and the oversight of banks; (iii) effective 
protection schemes for depositors and other protected clients or customers, and clear rules on 
the treatment of client assets; (iv) a robust accounting, auditing, and disclosure regime; and 
(v) a well-developed legal framework and judicial system.
37
 Cross-border cooperation and 
process standards support the effectiveness of resolution powers in the Key Attributes.
38
 
The FSB released the ‘Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions’ on 3 
November 2015. Principles cover statutory approaches, contractual recognition, temporary 
stays and early termination rights, and a bail-in tool. Contractual recognition supports cross-
border resolution enforceability, for example temporary stays on early termination rights and 
the write down, cancellation, or conversion of debt instruments.
39
 Where bail-in instruments 
are governed by foreign law, bail-in recognition clauses are to support debt instruments for 
home resolutions.
40
 
The FSB released the ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the 
orderly resolution of a global systemically important bank (G-SIB)’ which mandates the 
private sector as the first funding choice for bank resolutions.
41
 Government funding 
conditions are designed to mitigate moral hazard.
42
 Losses incurred from government-funded 
resolutions must be recovered.
43
 Cross-border cooperation is to be consistent and support 
group-wide resolution.
44
 Namely, the FSB approach to bank resolution does not either 
preclude the use of AMCs nor does it totally rule out the involvement of public money. On 
the contrary, the FSB standard stipulates that any public money involved in a bank resolution 
must be recovered. This is entirely plausible and, as will be discussed in Part III, a key feature 
of AMC centred resolution practices for reducing NPL ratios.  
                                                          
37
 FSB, ‘Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector – Methodology for Assessing the 
Implementation of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions in the Banking 
Sector’, (19 October 2016), 13. 
38
 FSB, ‘Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector – Methodology for Assessing the 
Implementation of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions in the Banking 
Sector’, (19 October 2016), 10-11. 
39
 FSB, ‘Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions’, (3 November 2015), 7. 
40
 FSB, ‘Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions’, (3 November 2015), 7-8. 
41
 FSB, ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global 
systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)’, (18 August 2016), 9-11. 
42
 FSB, ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global 
systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)’, (18 August 2016), 12-14. 
43
 FSB, ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global 
systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)’, (18 August 2016), 14. 
44
 FSB, ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global 
systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)’, (18 August 2016), 17 and 18. 
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The non-prohibition of public money ex ante, especially where a crisis has systemic 
characteristics and is largely the result of macroeconomic developments, or at least the result 
of generic factors such as management’s focus on Return on Equity (RoE) and bonuses (that 
can influence relaxed lending standards), does not infer that too-big-to-fail institutions must 
be encouraged. There are already a variety of tools to achieve this objective. For example G-
SIBs, which have been compared to super-polluters,
45
 that spread risk due to implicit 
government guarantees are subject to higher loss absorbency requirements and increased 
going-concern loss absorbency, to reduce the impact of any failure.
46
 G-SIBs capable of 
causing the greatest disruption are categorised as Bucket 5 and the least disruption are Bucket 
1. A Bucket 5 G-SIB requires an additional 3.5% CET1, with declining increments of 0.5% 
per bucket to 1% CET1 for Bucket 1.
47
 Currently the top ranking is Bucket 4—for example 
Citigroup (2016). Among others, UBS, RBS, Santander, and Unicredit Group are Bucket 1 
G-SIBs as of November 2016.  
 
In addition, G-SIBs are required to hold total loss-absorbing capital (TLAC). TLAC ensures 
loss-absorbency and recapitalisation is available for an orderly resolution that minimises 
financial instability, ensures continuity of critical functions, and avoids exposing taxpayers to 
loss.
48
 Proposed guiding principles include material sub-group identification, size of the 
TLAC requirement, composition and issuance, triggering mechanisms, and international 
coordination when writing-down and/or converting TLAC into equity.
49
 Supervisors need to 
address legal, regulatory, tax, or operational obstacles when implementing TLAC 
mechanisms.
50
 Minimum TLAC must be at least 16% of the resolution group’s risk weighted 
assets from 1 January 2019 and at least 18% by 1 January 2022.
51
 These requirements are in 
                                                          
45
 Andrew G. Haldane, ‘The 100 Billion question’, (30 March 2010) comment given at the Institute of 
Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong; see also: Andrew G. Haldane and Vasileios Madouros, ‘The dog and the 
frisbee’, (31 August 2012) Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th economic policy 
symposium, “The changing policy landscape”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.  
46
 BCBS, ‘Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss 
absorbency requirement’, (July 2013) Bank for International Settlements, 3. 
47
 Ibid. 12. 
48
 FSB, ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-
absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’, (9 November 2015), 5. 
49
 FSB, ‘Guiding Principles on the Internal Total Loss-absorbing Capacity of G-SIBs’, (16 December 2016) 
Consultative Document, 8. 
50
 FSB, ‘Guiding Principles on the Internal Total Loss-absorbing Capacity of G-SIBs’, (16 December 2016) 
Consultative Document, 20-21. 
51
 FSB, ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-
absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’, (9 November 2015), 10. 
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addition to Basel III capital requirements.
52
 Assuming that regulatory capital reflects the 
bank’s approach to offsetting economic capital against lending, these additional requirements 
and recent structural reforms, including ring-fencing in the UK, render difficulties in positing 
that the only way to contain moral hazard is with bail-in centred resolution and no form of 
public funding however temporary that may be. 
Of course, bank failures during financial crises usually involve domestic SIBs (D-SIBs) as G-
SIB failures are an outlier event. The BCBS issued a D-SIB regulatory framework in October 
2012. Analogous to the G-SIB framework, the D-SIB framework consists of an assessment 
methodology and high loss absorbency requirements. Loss absorbency is commensurate with 
D-SIB systemic importance.
53
  
C. European Union Standards and the Single Resolution Mechanism  
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first step towards an EU banking union 
(EBU).
54
 Its main aims are to ensure safety and soundness of the EU banking system, 
increase financial integration and stability, and ensure consistent supervision.
55
 The European 
Central Bank (ECB) enforces the SSM as the authority responsible for: (i) reviews, 
inspections, and investigations; (ii) licensing; (iii) assessing qualifying holdings; (iv) 
compliance; and (v) setting countercyclical capital buffers.
56
 On 4 November 2014, the ECB 
assumed responsibility for the SSM which is applicable to member banks. Another pillar of 
the EBU is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which is designed to bolster the 
resilience of the banking sector.
57
 On 1 January 2016 the SRM commenced operations.  
Banking crises have shown that the resolution of SIBs generally requires substantial public 
funds. However, the prevailing view is that because bail-outs are financially unsustainable 
and threaten sovereign solvency, the EU has enacted the BRRD, which provides authorities 
                                                          
52
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53
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2012) Bank for International Settlements, 8 (Principle 9). 
54
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6397_en.htm?locale=en (visited on 17 January 2017). 
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with arrangements to deal with failing banks by addressing weaknesses, mitigating public 
funds, and conforming with the FSB’s Key Attributes. 58  Members designate resolution 
authorities to apply resolution tools and exercise resolution powers.
59
 
There are four key elements of the BRRD: (i) preparation and prevention, (ii) early 
intervention, (iii) resolution, and (iv) cooperation and coordination. When a resolution is 
triggered, a number of objectives must be satisfied: (i) safeguarding the continuity of 
essential banking operations; (ii) protecting deposits, client assets, and public funds; (iii) 
minimising risks to financial stability; and (iv) avoiding unnecessary destruction of value.
60
 
Part IV of the BRRD lists four resolution tools: the sale of business tool, bridge institution 
tool, asset separation tool (i.e., AMC), and the bail-in tool.
61
  
Bail-in tools are viewed as important to mitigate moral hazard inherent with a strong reliance 
on bail-outs.
62
 The BRRD bail-in tool allows the resolution authority to write-down or 
convert to equity the claims of creditors in accordance with a pre-determined hierarchy.
63
 
This reduces the extent of a capital injection and therefore the burden on taxpayers and, in 
principle, acts as an additional capital buffer.
64
 What is, however, proving problematic is the 
BRRD’s requirement for banks in resolution to bail-in a minimum of 8% of liabilities before 
any contribution by the resolution fund or subsequent to that, a contribution injection of 
public funds.
65
 
Stress tests applied to Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena in late 2016 suggest that in 
extreme conditions CET1 is negative. Although the bank is solvent, under the SRM and 
forward-looking BRRD, additional CET1 must be raised in the market; otherwise a bail-in is 
required. To avert a resolution being triggered, the Government of Italy approved 
                                                          
58
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precautionary recapitalisation on 23 December 2016 based on the European Commission 
State Aid Rules, stating that the EU is subject to:  
… persistent risk of a serious disturbance in the economy ... to grant crisis-related 
support measures … as the crisis situation persists, creating genuinely exceptional 
circumstances where financial stability at large is at risk.
66
  
Admittedly the failed stress tests and the expected creditor bail-in under the BRRD caused 
wide-spread short-term instability in the Italian banking sector.
67
 
In September 2016, the ECB released ‘Draft guidance to banks on non-performing loans’ 
aimed at SIBs with high NPL levels which establish strategic objectives to reduce NPLs over 
realistic and ambitious time horizons.
68
 The guidance is non-binding, yet SIBs are subject to a 
‘comply or explain’ regime if requested by their supervisor. 69  Similar to the BCBS 
consultative document on the prudential treatment of problem assets, the ECB guidance 
centres on NPLs, forbearance, and NPEs. The guidance limits NPEs to reporting 
requirements.
70
 Definitions in the ECB and BCBS documents are analogous, as is the link 
between NPEs and forbearance. The guidance provides short- and long-term options which 
promote a consistent prudential treatment of distressed assets, and recognises IFRS 9 and 
ECLs. As discussed previously, an anomaly arises between the definitions of NPE/NPLs and 
ECL/IFRS 9, and fair value accounting is a counterproductive option that is bound to raise 
problems when the time comes to sell distressed assets.  
D. Causes and Consequences of Non-performing Loans 
In general, NPLs arise either as a result of crony banking, fraud, and relaxed underwriting 
standards, or due to a contracting macroeconomic cycle which impacts on the value of 
collateral. A contracting macroeconomic cycle is the hardest for banks to calculate their 
exposures against. For example, Spain’s banking sector was one of the worst affected by the 
crisis despite its banks having applied a sound dynamic pre-provisioning approach to 
                                                          
66
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of 
State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking 
Communication’)’, (30 July 2013), [5], [6], and [13]. 
67
 Philip Molyneux, ‘Will Italy’s failing banks trigger financial collapse across Europe?’, (28 November 2016) 
The Guardian: available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/28/italy-failing-banks-new-
japan (visited on 7 March 2017). 
68
 ECB, ‘Draft guidance to banks on non-performing loans’, (September 2016), 7. 
69
 ECB, ‘Draft guidance to banks on non-performing loans,’ (September 2016), 6. 
70
 ECB, ‘Draft guidance to banks on non-performing loans’, (September 2016), 46. 
15 
 
lending.
71
 A real estate bubble stimulated by the ECB’s low interest rates, compared with 
what would have been appropriate for the Spanish economy, rendered all prudential measures 
ineffective.
72
 This is a very important lesson for two reasons. Firstly, Spain highlights the 
limitations of the moral hazard argument, especially where the macroeconomic cycle and 
monetary policy have contributed more to the NPL crisis than bank management and 
shareholders (or creditors), especially since the latter are direct targets of moral hazard 
legislation. Secondly, the next crisis of loan defaults and NPLs is likely to be the 
consequence of today’s very relaxed monetary policy—historically low interest rates and 
quantitative easing. 
A new and insightful econometric methodology pioneered by Klein (2013)
73
 differentiates 
between bank-specific and macroeconomic factors using dynamic panel regressions. The 
method was recently adopted by the IMF in a study of Italian NPLs.
74
 More specifically, the 
IMF paper ran fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moments regressions of NPLs on 
various macroeconomic variables common to all banks, as well as bank-specific variables, to 
determine the role each played in the build-up of NPLs. The authors found that a number of 
macroeconomic variables played a significant factor with respect to the quantity of 
accumulated NPLs, concluding that both bank-level and macroeconomic factors have 
affected banks’ asset quality in Italy. Lower bank profitability is associated with higher NPL 
levels and a rapid loan book expansion due to (high growth rates or low interest rates) which, 
on average, results in lower asset quality: 
Overall, the results show that the recession, which was of exceptional duration and 
intensity, had a profound impact on banks’ asset quality, which was exacerbated by 
bank-specific factors.
75
  
E. Economic Consequences of Non-performing Loans and Moral Hazard 
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Legislation  
A significant body of past and present research, including on behalf of the IMF, suggest that 
banking sector NPL levels can be important for credit extension and growth.
76
 Weak bank 
balance sheets can act as a drag on economic activity, especially in economies such as the EU 
that rely mainly on bank financing. Relevant studies find that higher NPLs tend to reduce the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth, while increasing unemployment. A recent IMF study 
by Aiyar et al. has shown that this is also consistent with data from EU banks over the last 
five years.
77
  
 
Aiyar et al. have found that high NPL ratios constrain bank capital that could otherwise be 
used to increase lending, reduce bank profitability, and raise funding costs—thereby 
dampening the supply of credit.
78
 Reducing NPLs expeditiously is therefore crucial to 
support credit growth. For this reason the ESM view—solely relying on GDP growth will not 
lead to a sufficiently expeditious decline of NPL levels—carries additional weight.79 An IMF 
report on NPLs has noted that a lasting recovery following a financial crisis requires reducing 
the level of NPLs.
80
 Nonetheless, while the IMF has made the NPL ratio a key measurement 
of financial sector strength,
81
 there is no explanation or definition of an acceptable NPL ratio, 
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implying that the optimal ratio is the lowest possible. The rationale, as may be gauged by 
aforementioned IMF report, is that NPLs on banks’ balance sheets create uncertainty and 
weigh on the ability to resume lending, and therefore aggregate demand and investment.
82
  
The most likely source of such uncertainty extends to doubts about the bank’s solvency per 
se,
83
 because the affected bank has not written-down the true value of NPL assets, and the 
market assumes that the accounting value of capital on banks’ financial statements is 
overstated. Another important factor is that NPLs reduce bank profitability and no matter 
how well a bank appears to be capitalised, a bank with very low profitability is readily 
presumed as being close to having liquidity or solvency issues.
84
  
The large stock of NPLs is an important cause of anaemic economic activity in the Eurozone 
not only because of reduced lending, but also because of a persistent impression of bank 
fragility. A further issue is that unresolved NPLs suppress the economic activity of 
overextended borrowers
85
 and trap resources in unproductive activities. Therefore, resolving 
impaired loans is tantamount to tackling debt overhang, stimulating viable firms’ demand for 
new loans, while promoting the winding-down of unviable firms.
86
 Finally, cleaning up the 
bank lending channel would enhance the transmission of monetary policy to the real 
economy. 
These findings are very important with respect to how NPLs should be managed. A 
concentration of unresolved legacy loans with a stifling of new credit does not only impact on 
economic growth but also on the pace of innovation and the Schumpeterian cycle. In 
addition, this induces forms of parallel financing that may increase overall lending rather than 
decrease the supply of credit. A good example is China where the bulk of legacy loans are 
with state-owned enterprises operating in the old manufacturing sector, in contrast to the 
thriving new technology industries which have to resort to other more ingenuous and riskier 
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(from a financial stability perspective) forms of financing. This is especially applicable to 
NPLs arising as a result of gyrations in the macroeconomic cycle, rather than loose 
underwriting standards, crony banking or outright fraud, because taking a too principled 
stance vis-a-vis moral hazard when it comes to NPL resolution is frankly counterproductive. 
As mentioned previously, the recognition of losses under IFRS 9 can impact capital buffers 
and possibly trigger bail-in procedures, subject to banks’ discretion. Thus, a bank’s 
management has an incentive to procrastinate to avoid triggering bail-in events.
87
 Given that 
triggering CoCo conversion/redemption or pushing a bank into bail-in centred resolution 
could prove a disruptive affair if the nature of the problem is systemic, as would be the case 
with a national banking system loaded with NPLs, rather than idiosyncratic (referring to one 
bank),
88
 the behaviour of regulators is also uncertain.
89
  By analogy it has been suggested by 
the IMF that Italian bank managers face a number of tax obstacles, dis-incentivising the 
timely resolution of NPLs.
90
  
Bank management and regulatory inertia is of enormous importance for the timely resolution 
of NPLs and the extent of losses accrued by a bank. Timely and effective NPL resolution is 
key to the resumption of bank lending and tackling debt overhang (as explained above), but 
also impacts on the length of recovery and value of NPLs. As the IMF notes:  
The delays depreciate the value of the NPLs, and the prices buyers are ready to 
pay, after discounting the delays, are not attractive for the banks. A reduction in 
the time to recover loans would have a positive impact in the price of NPLs.
91
 
From this framework, we turn to a series of case studies considering approaches in the 
context of the major banking crises of the past twenty years. 
III. THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CHINA’S ASSET MANAGEMENT 
COMPANIES 
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Asia experienced its most significant financial crisis in 1997-1998. Severe economic and 
structural imbalances leading into the crisis destabilised banking systems. This section begins 
by examining the regulatory approaches and effects on the banking systems of Thailand, 
Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia, which were severely affected during the Asian crisis. An 
examination of China’s approach to banking system restructuring will follow. Together the 
examination of these key but dissimilar (given differentiated political regimes and approaches 
to private property) contexts show that endemically lax supervision and weak credit and bank 
governance regimes are rooted to a variety of causes rather than being the consequence of 
moral hazard due to the prospect of a bailout. Additionally, in these environments radical 
balance sheet restructuring from the use of state funds minimized ex post bank losses and 
taxpayer exposure and allowed domestic banks to resume lending.  
A. Thailand 
The easing of foreign exchange restrictions in the early 1990s allowed domestic banks to 
source funds internationally. Banks accounted for 64% of financial sector assets.
92
 Credit and 
reporting standards were lax—in 1996 the NPL ratio was 13%93 with banks holding 847 
billion Baht of NPLs.
94
 The banking system rapidly unwound from rising NPLs and a credit 
shortage.
95
  
On 5 August 1997 stand-by support of US$17.2 billion was provided by the IMF. The IMF 
policy was to restructure the finance sector by: (i) identifying and closing insolvent 
institutions; (ii) applying blanket government depositor and creditor guarantees; and (iii) 
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implementing structural and regulatory reforms.
96
 In August 1997 the Financial Restructuring 
Package prompted the development of a private AMC framework.
97
  
The Asset Management Corporation was established to dispense of NPLs auctioned by the 
Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA).
98
 NPLs transferred to state-owned AMCs from 
state-owned banks were guaranteed by the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) 
which eventually sustained losses.
99
 Later, in 1999, the Bank of Thailand (BoT) was tasked 
with supervision over state-owned AMCs.
100
  
The BoT supported NPL transfers to private AMCs. In accordance with the Emergency 
Decree on Asset Management Company (1998), AMCs managed distressed assets and 
resolved bad debts through asset restructurings, asset sales, foreclosures, or other legal 
actions. Effective distressed debt resolution was facilitated by credit facilities, securitizations, 
and debt-equity swaps.
101
 Upgraded rules recognised NPLs after six months rather than 
twelve, and provisions were made for NPLs during bank restructuring.
 102
  
To accelerate debt restructuring, a dispute resolution mechanism was established and the 
Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) assisted voluntary out-of-court 
restructurings. Regulatory and tax inducements spread the burden between debtors and 
creditors. The NPL ratio reached 42.9% (1998) and NPLs rose to 2,729 billion Baht in 1999, 
the equivalent of 47.7% total credit.
103
 NPLs took until 2005 to fall below 10% and to 2010 
to reach 3.9%.
104
 The CDRAC was partially credited with NPLs falling by more than 50% to 
17.91% in 2002.
105
 
FIDF borrowings to bail-out financial institutions amounted to 1.4 trillion Baht. Emergency 
legislation enabled the MoF to issue bonds to fund the bail outs. Outstanding bonds at the end 
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of 2013 stood at approximately 1.1 trillion Baht,
106
 despite emergency IMF loans having been 
repaid in 2003.
107
  
B. Indonesia 
Following the onset in Thailand, contagion spread throughout Asia. Indonesia experienced a 
rapid currency devaluation and shortages in consumer staples that resulted in political and 
civil unrest.
108
 The banking system was vulnerable, being characterised by crony lending and 
loose underwriting standards. On 31 October 1997 the central bank, Bank of Indonesia, and 
the IMF announced a Bank Resolution Package. The package covered 50 banks, with most 
committing or experiencing fraud. Performing assets were transferred from insolvent to 
solvent banks.
109
 The remaining banks were subject to the following conditions: (i) new 
investors would inject capital to cover some losses; (ii) NPLs were restructured over a 20 
year time horizon; (iii) new investors pledged collateral for the reconstructed NPLs; and (iv) 
the Bank of Indonesia would issue a long-term subordinated loan to cover investor NPL 
losses.
110
 With NPLs remaining on-balance sheet, the restructuring of insolvent banks was 
futile.
111
  
On 5 November 1997, an IMF US$10 billion standby facility was approved to support 
macroeconomic stability and banking system reforms. A second IMF programme was 
announced on 15 January 1998, followed by a government emergency plan involving: (i) a 
blanket guarantee of all depositors and creditors, (ii) establishing the Indonesia Bank 
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Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to rehabilitate weak banks and manage NPLs, and (iii) a 
corporate restructuring plan.
 112
  
IBRA was established pursuant to the ‘Decree of the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia’113 with three functions: (i) manage distressed credits (e.g. NPLs); (ii) manage 
investments; and (iii) a bank restructuring unit.
114
 Laws enabled IBRA to take control and sell 
insolvent banks’ NPLs without obtaining approval from borrowers or bank owners.115  
Legislation was passed in 1998 to shorten NPL time in arrears, strengthen NPL credit 
standards, address borrower repayment capacity, revise collateral valuation procedures, and 
reduce connected lending.
116
 The ‘Decree Concerning Debt Restructuring’ provided for: (i) 
asset and equity interest transfers in loan workouts, (ii) accounting rules, (iii) connected loan 
restructuring restrictions, and (iv) the classifications of restructured loans.
117
  
In April 1998, IBRA closed seven banks, another seven were taken over (approximately 16% 
of banking system assets), and 16 banks were under IBRA control.
118
 Management was 
replaced in six taken-over banks. International auditor reviews of private banks revealed 
wide-spread connected lending and identified six insolvent banks with NPL ratios 
approaching 55%, one exceeding 90%.
119
  
The Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency was established to reduce banking system short-
term funding pressures and provide a distressed debt restructuring framework.
120
 Advice and 
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mediation services were offered by the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF) to initiate 
voluntary debtor-creditor restructuring agreements. The JITF participated in one-third of 
corporate debt restructuring arrangements.
121
  
Over 400 trillion Rupiah of government-issued bonds, or 35% of GDP, were issued to fund 
the bank recapitalisation programme.
122
 Bank numbers halved after state closures and take-
overs.
123
 IBRA was responsible for 234 trillion Rupiah of NPLs, representing 19 per cent of 
GDP.
124
 NPL ratios peaked in 1998 at 48.6%, before falling to 31.9% in 2001, and 6.8% by 
2003.
125
  
C. South Korea 
South Korea’s economy is industrial and export-driven. In 1997 South Korea’s financial 
sector was underdeveloped, NPLs stood at 5.8%, and the banking system was exposed to 
short-term foreign debt.
126
 Following a sharp drop in the Won,
127
 South Korea lacked 
sufficient foreign currency liquidity to meet maturing liabilities,
128
 experiencing a flight of 
capital. Legislative measures were taken to stabilise the banking system.
129
 To absorb a rapid 
increase in NPLs, a Non-performing Asset Resolution Fund (NPARF) was established with 
3.5 trillion Won under the supervision of the Korean Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO).
130
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Legislative amendments enabled the central bank, the Bank of Korea (BoK), to implement 
credit policies,
131
 the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) to resolve and restructure 
banks, and provided supervisors with legal control over failing banks’ capital. 132  The 
Financial Supervisory Service
133
 and the banking supervisor—the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC)—were empowered to enforce write-offs, mergers, and closures. 134 
Moreover, the Corporate Restructuring Coordination Committee acted as a voluntary 
mediator for debt restructuring.
135
 KDIC supervised bank recapitalisations, KAMCO 
managed NPLs, with coordination directed by the FSC.  
Viable or solvent banks were recapitalised with NPLs purchased by NPARF on the condition 
of merger, management replacement, and downsizing.
136
 Recapitalisations and NPL 
purchases were funded by government capital injections and bond issues.
137
 Banks with high 
NPL ratios were closed down.
138
 Weak banks had to submit rehabilitation plans. 
On 4 December 1997, the IMF granted South Korea US$21 billion of stand-by credit with 
 
an 
additional US$36 billion available on the programme’s completion. 139  The first IMF 
restructuring exercise focused on distressed banks.
140
 Legislative changes to the definition of 
banks’ equity capital were made to reduce leverage and debt to equity ratios. 141  The 
classification of asset soundness and the BCBS capital adequacy requirements were 
tightened.
 142
 Loan-loss provisioning was abandoned and forward-looking asset (e.g. NPL) 
classifications were adopted.
 143
 
                                                          
131
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1997’, 28. 
132
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1997’, 28. 
133
 The administrative arm of the FSC. 
134
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1997’, 28-29; Kim Kihwan, ‘The 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis: Causes, 
Policy Response, and Lessons’, (July 2006) High-Level Seminar on Crisis Prevention in Emerging Markets, 
International Monetary Fund and the Government of Singapore, 13-14; and OECD, ‘Insolvency Systems in 
Asia: An Efficiency Perspective’, (2001) Finance and Investment, 179. 
135
 Dongsoo Kang, ‘Key Success Factors on the Revitalization of Distressed Firms: A Case of the Korean 
Workouts’, (February 2004) Korea Development Institute, 2-2. 
136
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1998’, 38-39. 
137
 Kim Kihwan, ‘The 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis: Causes, Policy Response, and Lessons’, (July 2006) 
High-Level Seminar on Crisis Prevention in Emerging Markets, International Monetary Fund and the 
Government of Singapore, 14-15. 
138
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1998’, 38. 
139
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1997’, 17. 
140
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1998’, 39. 
141
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1998’, 45. 
142
 Bank of Korea, ‘Annual Report: 1998’, 46. 
143
 Kim Kihwan, ‘The 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis: Causes, Policy Response, and Lessons’, (July 2006) 
High-Level Seminar on Crisis Prevention in Emerging Markets, International Monetary Fund and the 
Government of Singapore, 16. 
25 
 
Assessments by the FSC of 12 banks’ balance sheets revealed inadequate capital adequacy 
ratios.
144
 Between 1998 and 2002, nine banks merged.
145
 Bank numbers fell from 33 to 19.
146
 
The KDIC ceased operations in 2001 with recapitalisations of over 128 trillion Won.
147
 NPL 
ratios peaked at 8.9% in 2000 before falling to 3.4% during 2001.
148
  
D. Malaysia 
Malaysian loan growth averaged 25% per annum between 1994 and 1997.
149
 Banks held 
43.6% of total assets,
150
 with property sector loans accounting for one-third of total loans.
151
 
Banking system NPLs surged from 1, 255 to 3, 646 million Ringgit during 1997, an increase 
of over 190%.
152
 Prior to the crisis, NPLs were 4.1% before peaking at 18.6% in 1998.
153
 
Structural weaknesses were addressed by implementing a pre-emptive crisis programme.
154
 
NPLs were reclassified closer to international standards by reducing the period in arrears 
from six to three months and improving detection, identification, and monitoring.
 155
 Capital 
controls were applied to stem outflows.
156
 
In contrast to other countries, Malaysia only accepted IMF technical assistance. A 
restructuring plan consisted of creating: (i) a merger plan, (ii) an AMC—Danaharta—to 
manage NPLs, (iii) a special purpose vehicle—Danamodal, and (iv) a Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Committee (CDRC).
 157
 A Steering Committee on Restructuring chaired by the 
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Governor of the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the central bank, co-ordinated policies, 
operations, and the progress of these independent bodies.
 158
 
Danaharta was a limited liability company wholly owned by BNM designed to rehabilitate 
NPLs, restructure NPLs, and maximise NPL recovery value.
159
 Powers included acquiring 
and managing NPLs and appointing administrators. Rehabilitation focused on purchasing 
NPLs. Danaharta only purchased unmanageable NPLs.
160
 NPLs purchased realised a capital 
injection.  Banks sold NPLs to Danaharta if their gross NPL ratio exceeded 10%, with the 
residual written down and restructured.
161
 Danaharta then renegotiated NPL conditions with 
corporate borrowers.
162
 Recapitalised banks sold NPLs to Danaharta at fair market value, 
funded by the government and, when market conditions allowed, the sale of bonds.
163
 
Danaharta ceased purchasing NPLs in 2001 having dealt with RM52.4 billion—an expected 
recovery rate of 59%, with bonds totalling RM11.1 billion.
164
 This fiscal backstop and NPL 
portfolio restructuring proved successful. By 2005, RM29 billion or 94% of RM30.8 billion 
of outstanding NPLs had been recovered, with NPL ratios dropping to 9.4%.
165
 
Danamodal was a subsidiary of the BNM to facilitate bank recapitalisations. Existing bank 
shareholders were decimated because they absorbed all losses prior to recapitalisation.
166
 In 
contrast to Danaharta, the BNM enforced Danamodal’s powers so that capital was only 
injected into viable banks on commercial terms.
167
 Capital injections amounted to RM7.6 
billion and involved 10 institutions.
168
 Danamodal had recovered RM6.6 billion by 2003 
when it was wound down.
169
  
The CDRC facilitated the restructuring of corporate debt. Being a voluntary mechanism, the 
CDRC had no legal basis to compel debt restructuring. Recovery proceeds consisted of cash, 
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redeemable instruments, and rescheduled debts.
 170
 The CDRC was closed on 15 August 2002 
which ended Malaysia’s debt restructuring efforts.  
E. China 
 
(i) Asset management companies: 1998-2008  
China was insulated from the Asian financial crisis because, at that time, its financial sector 
was closed, currency convertibility was entirely controlled, and the economy was continually 
posting strong GDP growth. Export growth experienced a downturn in 2000 that took until 
2003 recover, peaking at 10% in 2005 before plunging to negative 10% in 2008-9.
171
 The 
banking system and its supervision were in transition during the crisis.  
Dominating the banking sector were four state-owned banks accounting for nearly two-thirds 
of total assets: (i) Bank of China (BoC); (ii) Agricultural Bank of China (ABC); (iii) China 
Construction Bank (CCB); and (iv) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
Despite strong GDP growth, the banking system was characterised by structural weaknesses, 
nascent prudential supervision, and lax underwriting standards. In 1997 the NPL ratio was 
20%.
172
 
Reforms to address these issues included the recapitalisation of state-owned banks, adopting 
NPL international classification standards, enforcement of commercially viable loans, and 
banning local governments from influencing lending decisions.
173
 The last two reforms 
centred on strengthening credit standards and quashing connected lending. Bank 
recapitalisation was funded by government-issued bonds valued at RMB270 billion.
174
 A 
risk-based classification of NPLs was adopted.
175
 Nonetheless NPL ratios remained over 
20%. 
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In 1999, four state-owned AMCs were established to transfer NPLs from corresponding state-
owned banks.
176
 Transfers of NPLs in 1999-2000 amounted to RMB1.4 trillion, about 20% of 
the banks’ combined loan book, or 18% of GDP.177 It has been estimated that this was less 
than half of total NPLs.
 178
  
NPLs were purchased by AMCs issuing bonds with credit supplied by the central bank.
 179
 
Disposals were slow and the recovery rate was 21%.
180
 After implementation of the reforms, 
NPL ratios took until 2004 to fall to 13.2%.
181
 The government decided to list two state-
owned banks on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. To strengthen balance 
sheets, the central bank transferred RMB320 billion in NPLs from the BoC and CCB to their 
AMCs for 30 to 40% of book value.
182
 The government injected US$45 billion of capital 
which boosted capital adequacy ratios and supported new lending to offset NPLs.
183
 Similar 
restructuring efforts were then applied to ABC and ICBC. 
NPLs dropped to 2.4% in 2008.
184
 This reduction was supported by very strong GDP growth. 
China’s NPL reduction was therefore not solely attributable to AMC transfers.  
(ii) Managing non-performing loans post-2008: An increasing concern  
As growth rates have decelerated and the levels of indebtedness risen, this has led to a 
substantive increase in NPLs. AMCs core business remains distressed debt although they 
have evolved into financial conglomerates. China Huarong Asset Management (CHAM) is 
the largest AMC having absorbed 55% or 264 billion yuan of bank NPLs in the first half of 
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2016.
185
 The Chairman of CHAM has stated that the quality of NPLs is deteriorating, 
tightening profit margins, with an average disposal time of one to three years.
 186
 Bank NPL 
ratios have increased for 19 consecutive quarters (August 2016) with debt to GDP being 
225%—corporate debt is 145%.187 The IMF has raised concerns and called for rebalancing 
measures, estimating that corporate loan portfolio losses could conservatively reach 7% of 
GDP in 2016.
188
  
In comparison to countries affected by the Asian financial crisis, China is in a more secure 
position because of the financial buffers and factors underpinning the banking system. Firstly, 
China has a relatively closed, albeit porous, capital account to stem the outflow of funds. 
Secondly, debt is mostly domestic and not foreign sourced. Thirdly, the largest banks and 
debtors are state-controlled and are therefore more akin to a corporate group, owned by the 
government which is willing and able to provide financial support. Finally, the largest AMCs 
are also state-controlled.  
Apart from the high level of NPLs there are a number of structural banking system concerns. 
The IMF estimates that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for 55% of corporate debt.
189
 
This heightens default risk, since China’s legal system is relatively lenient towards debt 
enforcement and recovery. For example, NPLs are universally defined as 90 days past due. 
The average collection time in China is 83 days, exceeded by certain industries: industrial 
firms average 131 days; technology companies average 120 days; and telecommunications 
firms average 118 days.
190
 Research suggests that banks routinely mischaracterise NPLs as 
‘structured investment products’.191 One estimate puts mischaracterisation at 20% of GDP.192 
Another issue is lending transparency and exposures outside the traditional banking system. 
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Moody’s Investor Services estimates (2015) that China’s shadow banking system accounts 
for nearly 80% of GDP.
193
 
The government is following a multi-pronged strategy to address the NPL problem— actively 
encouraging mergers or bankruptcies of technically insolvent companies, allowing provincial 
governments to establish AMCs, and introducing a debt for equity swap programme. Debt for 
equity operates akin to a bail-in tool. 
In May 2012, the banking supervisor approved provincial AMCs, with 27 since being 
established. These AMCs purchase NPLs and facilitate the debt for equity swap programme 
alongside state-owned AMCs. Provincial AMCs are preferred to manage distressed local 
SOEs, benefitting from local governments ability to order local SOEs to sell NPLs.
194
  
The debt to equity swap programme focuses on distressed steel and coal companies. 
Technically insolvent companies are excluded from the programme.
195
 Each swap involves 
three parties, the originator (creditor) bank, the SOE debtor, and a third-party executor.
196
 
Upon receiving approval from the banking supervisor, distressed SOEs exchange debt for 
equity thereby strengthening their balance sheet. Executors are a big four SOE bank which 
purchases the debt (e.g. NPLs) before selling on to an AMC. Effectively the debt is retained 
by the government until realised by the AMC. Each transaction in the chain diminishes NPL 
value and spreads the risk among government agencies. Essentially this amounts to a bail out 
of the four big SOE banks. The programme began operating on 25 October 2016 with the 
banking supervisor issuing draft regulations. 
F. Lessons from the Asian Crisis: Key Characteristics and the Effectiveness of 
Banking Sector Restructuring  
During banking crises balance sheets are placed under extreme stress requiring restructuring 
through capital and equity injections, renegotiating credit terms, and transferring distressed 
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assets off-balance sheet. Banking system bail-outs require adequate legal/regulatory 
frameworks and supervision—for example, risk management, capital and liquidity buffers, 
restrictions on large exposures, transparent credit standards, bank restructuring frameworks, 
and effective distressed debt transfer mechanisms. 
Capital adequacy ratios of 8% to 10% proved insufficient to absorb high levels of NPLs. 
These levels satisfied BCBS recommendations at the time of the Asian crisis. Capital ratios 
were the main solvency buffer as CoCos, bail-in debt instruments, and pre-crisis resolvability 
and resolution plans had not been developed.  
When the crisis reached a stage whereby banks required balance sheet and business model 
restructuring to remain solvent, NPL and bank resolution regimes were either underdeveloped 
or non-existent. Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea were forced to accept IMF support to 
bail-out or recapitalise their banking systems. Large capital injections are necessary to 
stabilise bank balance sheets, which may result in state ownership to provide additional 
balance sheet stability. 
The IMF bank resolution policies focused on closing and liquidating insolvent institutions 
and the provision of government guarantees, with capital restructuring being the last resort. 
Indonesia epitomises the policy of closing down rather than restructuring banks with bank 
numbers halving within a few years. Bank closures reduced Indonesia’s NPL ratio, yet this is 
attributable to the efforts of a few banks which had particularly high NPL ratios. A 
concentration of bank closures in Thailand did not correlate with a drop in NPL ratios in the 
short-term—i.e., 3 years. Indonesia and Thailand had the highest level of closures and 
experienced the deepest and longest disruptions to their banking systems and financial 
stability requiring the most extensive use of public funds.  
Resolving systemic banking system crises by focusing on closures rather than balance sheet 
restructuring weakens confidence. A resolution policy that prioritises closures does not 
correlate with banking system strength and stability. Paradoxically, this was a condition of 
the IMF support programme. Malaysia, which did not request an IMF bail-out nor supported 
widespread bank closures, had a more effective banking sector restructuring programme 
because of the pre-emptive and well-planned implementation of an effective NPL transfer 
mechanism which maintained confidence throughout the crisis.  
32 
 
Indonesia’s reluctance to implement reforms and provide appropriate legislative backing 
intensified its banking crisis and hindered NPL resolution efforts. In contrast in South Korea 
the existing framework was modified expeditiously to mitigate rising NPLs which proved 
effective.  
All jurisdictions experienced significant NPL reduction and banking system stabilisation after 
bank consolidation had taken place and debt restructuring arrangements became operational. 
Debt restructuring was contingent of legislative and regulatory frameworks.  Thailand was 
slow to respond and Indonesia was reluctant to implement effective reforms. This hesitation 
offers critical lessons as it maintained banking system fragility since NPLs continued to surge 
in contrast to the pre-emptive approaches taken in South Korea and Malaysia.  
Government guarantees were essential to stabilising banking systems and a condition of the 
IMF bail-out. China implicitly guaranteed bank lenders’ solvency and borrowers’ repayment 
ability because state-owned banks lent to state-owned enterprises. Guarantees may be an 
effective and efficient component of the restructuring framework because they increase 
banking system confidence, yet are rarely enforced.   
While all of these programmes involved a form of public funding, variations have been 
observed with regards to the most effective form of restructuring and public intervention. 
Experience from the Asian crisis shows that expeditious debt restructuring programmes and 
legal frameworks rather than bank closures proved to be the most effective approach to 
restructure banking systems and restore viability in the context of a systemic banking crisis.  
The use of AMCs was instrumental in cleansing bank balance sheets of NPLs, strengthening 
capital ratios in the longer-term, stabilising banking systems, and enhancing banks’ capacity 
to re-start lending aiding regional economic recovery. AMCs were funded either by 
government capital injections or the sale of bonds.  
Conversely, there is no clear evidence whether state-owned or private AMCs were more 
effective bail-out mechanisms. Debt overhang from Thailand’s NPLs programme is an 
ongoing problem. China’s AMC performance cannot be properly assessed around the time of 
the state-owned bank privatisations because the extensive bank recapitalisations distorted the 
banking system. 
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KAMCO is a good example of how an existing AMC, with a majority of funding coming 
from bond issues (i.e. private sector), can be used as a counter-cyclical relief mechanism. A 
potential banking crisis was promptly abated from a surge in NPLs while mitigating taxpayer 
expenditure. This in our view is an important finding. Banks need to be equipped with tools 
to manage NPLs promptly to avoid distressed assets festering, destabilising balance sheets 
and confidence, as is occurring in certain Eurozone countries. 
 
IV. BANK RESCUE CASE STUDIES FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: UBS, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND AND CITIGROUP 
This section focuses on the approaches adopted during the GFC in Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) to restructure UBS, the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
and Citigroup. Switzerland and the UK managed guarantee-based programmes rather than 
asset sales. The US operated a guarantee programme and a Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to purchase distressed assets.
197
 
A. UBS 
On 1 October 2007, UBS announced a write down of 4 billion Swiss francs (CHF) from 
investments in asset-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations.
198
 Performance of 
these instruments was linked to NPLs—US sub-prime mortgages.199  
UBS received a government capital injection of CHF6 billion, consisting of mandatory 
convertible notes (i.e. converting into equity/capital) and the sale of NPLs and NPL linked 
instruments, from the Swiss National Bank (‘SNB’—the central bank).200 These distressed 
assets were then transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), the ‘StabFund’. 201  The 
StabFund was designed to absorb UBS distressed assets and realise a return.  
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The StabFund was a limited partnership consisting of two partners solely owned by the SNB: 
an unlimited liability partner managing the SPV, and a limited liability partner.
202
 Distressed 
asset purchases were financed by SNB loans and UBS equity contributions—a maximum of 
10% of asset purchased up to US$6 billion.
203
 Equity contributions were designed to absorb 
the first 10% of losses.
204
 UBS had an option to purchase the StabFund from the SNB after 
repaying all loans.
205
 Once the loan was repaid, UBS was entitled to receive the first US$1 
billion of profit, with UBS and SNB sharing profits thereafter.
206
  
Distressed assets totalling US$38.7 billion were sold to the StabFund between December 
2008 and April 2009. Asset sale returns were US$15.8 billion which were used to repay SNB 
loans.
207
 A profit of CHF1.2 billion was realised by the Swiss government selling its CHF6 
billion UBS equity. The final SNB loan repayment was made by UBS in August 2013. UBS 
exercised the option to purchase the StabFund in September 2013.  
B. Royal Bank of Scotland 
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) grew dubiously through a series of aggressive 
acquisitions, notably the 2007 partial purchase of ABN AMRO.
208
 Following the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, RBS capital and liquidity became severely strained. NPLs rose 
dramatically from 1.4% to 5% in 2009, reaching 9% by 2013.
209
 
On 8 October 2008 the UK government announced the rescue and recapitalisation of RBS. 
The European Commission approved the Bank of England’s (BoE) recapitalisation measures 
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including a guarantee under ‘EU State Aid Rules’ on 13 October 2008.210 An initial sale of 
£15 billion in RBS shares, underwritten by the government, attracted virtually no subscribers. 
This forced the government to purchase the bulk of RBS shares, effectively a capital injection 
and nationalisation. BoE emergency loans provided an additional £20 billion 
recapitalisation,
211
 with the government holding 90.6 billion RBS shares, 70% of voting 
shares and 84% of total capital.
212
   
On 3 November 2008 the government established United Kingdom Financial Investments Ltd 
(UKFI) to manage the RBS and Lloyds recapitalisations and the government’s equity 
interest/capital injections. A condition of the RBS capital injection was participation in the 
Asset Protection Scheme (APS), established to protect banks against losses on distressed 
assets.
213
 RBS sought protection for £325 billion in assets (e.g. NPLs), subsequently revised 
to £282 billion. Liability was distributed—the first £60 billion of asset losses absorbed by 
RBS with losses thereafter falling on RBS and government at 10% and 90% respectively.
214
 
Effectively the government was providing a guarantee against 90% of distressed asset losses 
above a pre-determined threshold.  
The APS function was analogous to a state-owned AMC managing bank NPLs, yet differed 
because asset ownership remained with the bank on-balance sheet. This arrangement was 
quicker to implement and did not require capital injections to purchase distressed assets.
215
 
However, there were marked disadvantages—chiefly, retaining distressed assets on-balance 
sheet and the bank not receiving any NPL sale proceeds. Larger government capital injections 
were eventually required to maintain bank solvency until an NPL return was realised. 
Shareholder and creditor claims are diluted unless protected.
216
 RBS exited the APS on 18 
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October 2012, and the APS ceased operations realising a £5 billion profit.
217
 RBS removed 
over £1 trillion in assets from its balance sheet.
218
  
On 3 November 2009, the government announced that RBS would be restructured including 
inter alia raising its credit rating to AA standard, a CET1 ratio above 8% (compared to 4% in 
2008), and separating and disposing of non-core assets.
219
 RBS is still struggling to dispose of 
these assets and is currently seeking a buyer for a bloc of 315 branches that it is obliged to 
dispose of under the amended terms of its restructuring plan in accordance with the EU state 
aid rules.
220
 
The government is disposing of its RBS equity although this should recoup £32 billion when 
total investment exceeds £45 billion.
221
 Privatising RBS is ongoing with equity sales realising 
losses of £1 billion as of early 2017. 
C. Citigroup 
The US$700 billion ‘Troubled Asset Relief Program’ or ‘TARP’ was designed to stabilise the 
US finance system by purchasing distressed assets.
222
 TARP consisted of sub-programmes 
including the Capital Purchase Program (CCP) to inter alia strengthen bank capital.
223
 
Citigroup was a recipient of the TARP CCP, receiving US$25 billion on 28 October 2008. 
Citigroup subsequently revealed a loss of US$27.68 billion, causing its share price to plunge.  
On 23 November 2008 Citigroup agreed to a government bail-out. Distressed assets (e.g. 
CDOs) were the greatest threat to Citigroup’s viability.224 Citigroup’s bail-out included a 
US$301 billion government guarantee on a pool of assets under the Asset Guarantee Program 
(AGP). The AGP retained distressed assets on Citigroup’s balance sheet.  
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The terms of AGP rendered Citigroup liable for the first US$39.5 billion in losses.
225
 TARP 
and Citigroup would then absorb US$5 billion and US$0.6 billion respectively. Following 
losses would be absorbed at US$10 billion by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and US$ 1.1 billion by Citigroup. Losses thereafter would be serviced by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) by securing a loan over remaining guaranteed assets at 
90% collateral value. The capital injection provided an additional buffer against losses 
sustained under the AGP.
 226
  
To strengthen Citigroup’s balance sheet a TARP capital injection of US$20 billion was 
exchanged for Citigroup preferred shares. This approach, the Targeted Investment Program 
(TIP), was adopted because standard TARP funding was insufficient to stabilise Citigroup.
227
 
A quarterly dividend of 8% per annum was paid by Citigroup for TIP. 
Citigroup’s share price continued to decline precipitously, undermining the TIP capital 
injection. In July 2009, US$25 billion in preferred equity, obtained through TARP’s CCP, 
was exchanged for common stock. Citigroup had become partially nationalised.  
In September 2009, Citigroup notified the Treasury that it wanted to repay and exit TIP, and 
terminate the AGP. Conditions included maintaining sufficient capital levels, an ability to 
access long-term debt markets without government assistance, and raising common equity by 
50% of the Treasury’s redeemable equity.228 To increase its capital levels, on 23 December 
2009 Citigroup issued 5.4 billion common shares for US$17 billion, and tangible equity units 
of US$3.5 billion.
229
 The Treasury unwound its position in Citigroup’s TARP, AGP and TIP 
programmes on 10 December 2010, selling 7.7 billion common shares for a profit of US$12 
billion.
230
  
D. Analysis and Evaluation 
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During the earlier stages of the GFC, when inadequate capital and liquidity buffers combined 
with excessive leverage ratios were exposed, systemic bank bail-outs as opposed to closure 
and liquidation were the preferred approach, perhaps, due to lack of legally viable bail-in 
regimes. The approach taken by the authorities in the UBS, RBS, and Citigroup rescues went 
counter to the approach adopted by the IMF in the Asian crisis. Governments provided 
massive capital injections, thereby effecting partial bank nationalisations albeit structured – 
importantly – in each case to avoid being taken onto the government’s balance sheet.  
G-SIBs became fragile from an over-exposure to NPLs and/or NPL linked financial 
instruments (e.g., derivatives, CDOs). This complicated bail-outs and the establishment of 
AMCs to sequester distressed assets from banks. RBS and Citigroup were subject to 
government guarantees, retaining distressed assets on-balance sheet. UBS transferred 
distressed assets to an AMC—a similar process to that adopted in the Asian crisis. Both 
approaches strengthened balance sheets and stabilised financial systems, eventually allowing 
banks to resume lending. Nevertheless, both programmes exposed governments to bail-out 
liability.  
Rescue frameworks were sourced from existing legislation to aid prompt implementation and 
participating banks signed contractual agreements with regulators to facilitate restructuring 
and uphold ensuing obligations on the part of the banks. Switzerland injected capital and took 
an ownership position in UBS at the beginning of the programme. In contrast, hesitation in 
the UK forced the government to convert and purchase equity in RBS after its share issue 
underwriting failed. This hesitation is analogous to that of Indonesia and Thailand which 
eroded confidence and the success of a bail-out programme. 
Switzerland’s restructuring approach highlights the advantage of ‘loss control’ when using an 
AMC as opposed to a state guarantee. Regulators can control the timing of the sale of NPL 
distressed assets until more favourable market conditions prevail, effectively mitigating 
losses and government liability.  
In contrast, RBS and Citigroup employed guarantees retaining distressed assets on-balance 
sheet, necessitating larger capital injections to strengthen balance sheets thereby increasing 
state ownership stakes, heightening potential taxpayer risks. Bank liability from the disposal 
of distressed assets under the UK and US guarantee schemes compelled banks to absorb 
initial losses. Distressed asset sales under a guarantee scheme are usually executed 
39 
 
immediately when market conditions may not mitigate losses. Thus a guarantee approach can 
create inefficiencies, since the risk of government liability is elevated in depressed markets 
which may necessitate further capital injections. 
The guarantee schemes were profitable and relatively short-lived. Despite substantive 
taxpayer risk, the guarantee programmes were effective and efficient in managing distressed 
assets, stabilising G-SIBs, stemming creditor runs, and maintaining banking system stability.  
Switzerland’s central bank had a far greater exposure to potential losses than the UK and US 
guarantee schemes. Since the central bank was the AMC’s creditor and equity holder, if the 
AMC failed the central bank would be exposed to unlimited liability. If UBS losses were 
substantial, Switzerland’s central bank (i.e., taxpayer) exposure would shield UBS from 
liability. Either way, while this approach entails risks for a central bank’s credibility and 
credit standing, ultimately this is not a major solvency risk as central bank losses in its own 
currency can be inflated and absorbed in the long-run. Conversely, Switzerland’s approach is 
more effective in strengthening banks’ capital base and more efficient since further capital 
raising is not necessary. For these reasons this approach is preferable to a guarantee scheme. 
 
V. THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND BANKING SECTOR RESTRUCTURING 
This section analyses the impact of the European debt crisis on the banking systems of Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, and Greece by examining distressed asset and bank recapitalisation approaches. 
One point that is evident from the analysis below: stricken Eurozone countries were more 
proactive in tackling banks’ distressed debt before the implementation of the BRRD, rather 
than afterwards, even though during both periods the EU state aid regime has been largely 
unaltered. 
A. Spain 
Spain experienced a property bubble prior to the European debt crisis. After the bubble burst, 
Spain entered into recession in January 2009 at which point NPLs exceeded 4%, peaking 
over 9% in 2014.
231
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The government established the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) to restructure 
banks. FROB was capitalised with €9 billion to take-over non-viable banks, subscribe 
convertible instruments to merge viable banks, and subscribing ordinary shares to recapitalise 
viable banks.
232
 The banking system reform strategy was implemented in three phases: (i) 
consolidation, (ii) solvency improvement, and (iii) cleaning-up balance sheets.
233
 Spain 
entered a second recession in 2012.  
Spain sought a banking system bail-out of €100 billion from the ESM. Financial assistance 
was implemented through FROB in accordance with EU State Aid Rules. Conditions 
included diagnosing bank capital requirements based on asset quality, transferring distressed 
assets from bank balance sheets to an AMC, recapitalising and restructuring of viable banks, 
and an orderly resolution of non-viable banks sharing the burden with the private sector.
234
  
Banking system stress tests identified additional capital requirements ranging from €25.9 
billion to €59.3 billion.235 This resulted in the partial nationalisation of a number of banks for 
€38.9 billion, and €2.5 billion to establish an AMC—Asset Management Company for Assets 
Arising from Bank Restructuring (Sareb). The programme consisted of three procedures: (i) 
early intervention, (ii) restructuring, and (iii) resolution. This section focuses on the 
restructuring procedure.  
Sareb’s purpose is to receive, manage, and dispose of distressed assets from banks receiving 
government assistance.
236
 The FROB has the power to transfer distressed assets from banks 
to Sareb for independent management.
237
 Sareb is a public limited company with a 15 year 
lifespan to liquidate assets. The majority of Sareb’s shares are private (i.e. 55%), owned 
mainly by SIBs. FROB (i.e. the government) owns the remaining 45% of Sareb. In exchange 
for distressed assets, Sareb issues government guaranteed bonds that can be used as collateral 
for financing.
238
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Banks are classified into recapitalisation plan groups. Group 1 consists of four banks where 
the FROB is the major shareholder (i.e. partial nationalisation). Distressed assets, 
approximately 200,000 or €36.5 billion, were transferred from Group 1 banks to Sareb. 
Group 2 banks transferred €14 billion of distressed assets, 80% NPLs and 20% collateral (i.e. 
property), to Sareb.
239
 Total banking system doubtful debts were €195 billion and provisions 
for bad debts and country risk as contra assets were €133 billion.240  
From January 2013, banks are required to hold a capital ratio of 9%.
241
 Total doubtful assets 
rose to €204 billion by June 2013 despite provisioning for bad debts and country risk falling 
to €126 billion.242 Eventually, Spain’s NPL ratio rose from 7.5% to 9.4%.243 By March 2016 
the NPL ratio had dropped to 6%.
244
  
In January 2014, Spain exited the EU financial assistance programme. Total doubtful assets 
continued to rise to €222 billion with the provision for bad debts and country risks remaining 
steady.
245
 Doubtful loans made up over half of all refinanced and restructured loans in the 
banking system.
 246
  
Sareb’s statutory objective is to ensure the most efficient use of public resources. 247 
Nonetheless, Sareb has posted losses for every financial year since its inception. AMC profit 
margins from NPL distressed asset sales are determined from exogenous market factors over 
time. The recovery of Spain’s real estate sector is critical for Sareb’s profitability because 
100% of its assets are located in Spain and are collateralised in real estate. Exogenous market 
factors have created low quality asset tranches, adversely affecting Sareb’s profitability.  
The capacity of an AMC to efficiently use public resources is contingent on the development 
of the market for NPL collateral, collateral concentration, NPL quality, and foreign investor 
participation. For Spain, this indicates a need for the government to introduce policies to 
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stimulate its real estate market, including through the use of foreign investment, to improve 
collateral and loan quality. 
B. Ireland 
Ireland experienced a credit boom typified by connected lending and a lowering of credit 
standards resulting in a highly levered banking system that was heavily exposed to the 
property sector.
248
 Illiquid wholesale funding markets coincided with a downturn in the credit 
and property cycles,
 
triggered a collapse in the banking system.
249
  
To manage a spike in bank NPLs, a state-owned AMC, the National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA), was established in December 2009.
250
 NAMA is funded by issuing bonds. 
The purpose of NAMA is to address serious economic threats, and the stability of banks and 
the finance sector.
251
 This involves inter alia expeditious and efficient economic recovery, 
protecting state and taxpayer interests, restructuring banks, and restoring banking system 
confidence.
252
 NAMA is empowered to provide capital, credit, and restructurings or 
reorganisations.
253
  
In December 2010 Ireland accepted an IMF/EU €85 billion bail-out, to restructure its NPL 
ridden banking system. Key objectives of the rescue programme were to identify viable banks 
and implement strengthening measures (i.e. downsizing and reorganisation), recapitalising 
banks, encouraging bank deposit inflows and market-based funding, strengthen banking 
supervision, and introduce a bank resolution framework.
254
  
NAMA acquired bank NPLs secured by real estate. The acquisitions amounted to €74.2 
billion, involving 850 debtors and 11,000 loans collateralised on 16,000 properties.
255
 NAMA 
acquired the NPLs at a 57% discount, paying €31.8 billion by issuing government guaranteed 
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senior notes and €1.6 billion in subordinated debt securities.256 There were a number of 
delays in restructuring distressed debt. Legal obstacles included the one year foreclosure 
moratorium on defaults and a High Court decision to prohibit summary proceedings for 
mortgages originating before 2009.
257
 By 2015, 73% of senior debt issued was redeemed, 
€22.1 billion, and NAMA stated that redemption of all senior debt would occur by 2018.258  
Ireland exited the IMF/EU bail-out in December 2013. Nonetheless, Irish banks still had a 
substantial volume of NPLs on-balance sheet.
259
 The IMF attributed this to weak accounting 
standards,
260
 notably IAS 39—a backward looking provisioning approach for loss accruals. 
This changed in May 2013 with the implementation of IFRS 9—a forward looking approach 
that recognises NPLs expeditiously. Mortgage Arrears Resolution Targets were introduced, 
forcing banks to sustain short-term forbearance, thereby reducing arrears.
261
 In 2014, the 
three largest banks NPL ratios were 17%, 33%, and 45%.
262
 On-balance sheet NPLs 
represented 19% of banks’ combined loan book in 2016.263  
Despite high NPL ratios, NAMA is focused on redeeming senior debt. The process 
concentrates on efficiency, mirroring the NAMA Act 2009 statutory purpose.
264
 The reason 
for establishing NAMA or any AMC is to effectively cleanse bank balance sheets of 
distressed assets. The EU BRRD states: 
Resolution authorities …transfer assets, rights or liabilities only if: …(b) such a 
transfer is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the institution under 
resolution; or (c) such a transfer is necessary to maximise liquidation proceeds…265 
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High NPL ratios impede banks’ proper functioning thus obliging NAMA to purchase NPLs. 
Therefore, the NAMA Act does not comply with the BRRD. NAMA is statutorily obliged to 
perform its functions to obtain the best possible returns for the State.
266
 In contrast, Sareb is 
designed to: 
… take measures necessary to transfer assets on the balance sheet … in the case of 
highly impaired assets or assets who continued presence on the balance sheet could 
affect the viability of the institution ...
267
 
The purpose of the NAMA Act 2009 requires amending to include a transfer of distressed 
assets that could affect bank viability. Viability is probably judged against the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and BRRD. Nonetheless, Ireland’s definition of ‘viability’ 
requires a quantitative NPL ratio benchmark, for example below 5%, to meet its BRRD 
obligations. 
Despite NAMA being profitable and efficient, relatively high bank NPL ratios undermine 
NAMA’s effectiveness—transferring distressed debt off banks’ balance sheets. Nonetheless, 
it is important that the state mitigates the use of taxpayer funds. 
C. Italy 
The Italian economy is experiencing a prolonged low growth period because of structural 
imbalances within its economy and an inert public sector. The Eurozone crisis has 
accentuated this low growth environment and has contributed to Italy’s very high levels of 
sovereign indebtedness which have recently exceed 133% of GDP. Following the eruption of 
the European debt crisis in early 2010, credit conditions tightened after wholesale funding 
markets became illiquid and credit risk intensified.
268
 By the end of 2011, the Italian banking 
system’s CET1 averaged 9.3% with leverage lower than comparable European banks.269 
Italy’s NPL ratio was 11.7% and over half of gross NPLs were bad debts.270  
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Long insolvency and credit recovery procedures depressed NPL valuations.
271
 In 2011 
insolvency proceedings averaged six years.
272
 The government redressed the long procedures 
through a number of reforms. Pre-bankruptcy creditor agreements were introduced to 
facilitate full or partial company sales, out-of-court dispute procedures—assisted negotiations 
and first instance court appeals arbitration referrals, and frivolous cases are discouraged with 
judges able to accelerate ordinary civil proceedings by enforcing summary proceedings.
273
  
Nonetheless, one-third of cases still last between three years to five years.
274
 Bank balance 
sheet NPLs were €350 billion in 2015.275 Transfers of NPLs by sale or securitisation were €7 
billion in 2013-2014.
276
 One reason for these high NPL levels is the long credit recovery 
procedures.
277
  
As a result, further amendments came into force in August 2015 to increase creditor recovery 
rates—out-of-court restructuring agreements apply to debts constituting 50% or more of bank 
total liabilities.
278
 Court proceedings for forced collateral sales have been simplified and 
shortened.
279
 Auction rules allow bids to start at 75% of asset value.
280
  
The tax treatment of loan loss provisions was not synchronised with the EU, for example 
immediate deductions were not allowed.
281
 This prompted amendments for full and 
immediate tax deductibility of loan write-downs and write-offs.
282
 These reforms have 
resulted in bankruptcy and enforcement procedures becoming shorter and more efficient.
283
  
To circumvent inefficient procedures, large banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms have 
formed SPV partnerships targeting corporate loans. These partnerships lever activist 
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investing skills to control and restructure companies—for example, debt equity swaps and 
new equity.
284
  
Large banks have set up AMC SPVs to dispose of NPLs off-balance sheet. These NPLs only 
constitute €2-3 billion and progress is slow because Italy’s NPL market was virtually non-
existent prior to 2015.
285
  
Italy has the fifth largest NPL ratio in the EU,
286
 which stabilised at 18% of bank loan books 
by July 2016.
287
 The banking system consists of many small banks that are inexperienced in 
managing NPLs.
288
 Legislation was passed to merge cooperative banks to reduce the number 
and increase size. In November 2015, four unviable small banks were recapitalised (€3.6 
billion) by the central bank, the Bank of Italy, under a new Italian Resolution Fund. The 
Italian Resolution Fund is financed by the three largest banks.
289
 Existing shareholders and 
subordinated debt will absorb losses.
290
 All four banks were restructured into bridge banks 
with bad debts transferred to an AMC.
291
 Bridge bank capital is held by the Resolution Fund, 
supervised by the Bank of Italy.
292
 An expression of interest to sell the bridge banks was 
issued by the Bank of Italy a month later. In 2017 it was announced that three would be sold 
for nominal consideration—€1—as they require around €450 million to meet capital 
requirements and are burdened with NPLs.
293
  
The government is in the process of creating a state-owned AMC SPV to accelerate the 
transfer of NPLs, although prudent progress is required in order not to violate BRRD 
strictures. Benefits mooted by the Bank of Italy for the creation of an AMC include lower 
costs, transparent balance sheets, enhancing funding channels, eliminating credit constraints, 
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increasing competition, increasing banking system efficiency through consolidation, and 
developing the distressed debt market.
294
 AMC NPLs are limited to bad debts—€210 billion 
in December 2015, over half of all NPLs.
295
 
AMCs are subject to EU State Aid Rules which restrict state subsidies. Accordingly, NPL 
sales must be at market value/terms. To facilitate NPL sales, there is a government guarantee 
option. Valuing Italy’s NPLs has delayed the establishment of the AMC. An AMC plan to 
allow banks to sell NPLs to a state-owned AMC was approved by the European Commission 
on 26 January 2016. This effectively transfers the risk and potential cost onto the taxpayer.  
The BRRD bail-in rules impose an obstacle because NPL restructures which result in 
substantial losses will require a bank recapitalisation. This effectively creates a charge or 
hypotheca on banks’ capital buffers. Before a failing bank receives a capital injection, 
creditors (i.e. bondholders) must be bailed-in to the equivalent of 8% of liabilities. With retail 
investors making-up about one-third of all bank bondholders
296
, any bail-in would affect a 
large proportion of the population with potentially adverse consequences for banking 
system.
297
 Italian bank management and regulators have not prioritised high NPLs and bank 
recapitalisations.
 298
 
Prerequisites for the efficient and effective transfer of NPLs are: (i) laws that facilitate the 
expeditious transfer of NPLs; (ii) a legal system that does not depress NPL values; (iii) tax 
laws that promote the purchase and sale of NPLs; (iv) NPL guidance and infrastructure for 
small or inexperienced banks; and (v) the development of a distressed asset market.  
The first prerequisite requires a statutory transfer regime that mitigates debtors frustrating the 
process. For example, Spain has legislated that: 
Assets shall be transferred to the asset management company with no need for third-
party consent to be obtained, by means of any legal transaction, and with no need to 
meet the conditions of structural changes to commercial companies. In this respect, no 
provisions of article of association or contractual clauses restricting the transfer of 
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holdings may be bought to bear against such transfers, and no liability of 
compensation claims of any kind may be filled for breach of such provisions or 
clauses.
299
 
If the design of the AMC framework does not support efficient and effective NPL transfers, it 
will be a futile exercise. By excluding third party consent, contractual obligations, and 
liability, NPL transfers between banks and AMCs can be expeditious without incurring 
additional costs.  
With more than 50% of NPLs not classified as bad debts and remaining on-balance sheet, the 
Decree’s objective of transferring ‘highly impaired assets or assets who continued presence 
on the balance sheet could affect the viability of the institution’300 is not satisfied.  
Recently, recapitalisations have increased in Italy with the build-up of on-balance sheet 
NPLs. After failing to raise €5 billion in capital in December 2016, the government approved 
a bail-out (liquidity guarantees and precautionary recapitalisation of €8.8 billion) of Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, Italy’s third largest bank—in accordance with the EU BRRD.301 The 
precautionary recapitalisation was designed not to trigger a bail-in. A decree was passed 
whereby the bank’s subordinated bonds were converted into equity.302 Retail investors are 
fully compensated with newly issued senior bonds.
303
 The state guarantee on senior tranches 
of securitisation transactions is available to all banks for a fee,
304
 and bail-outs are funded by 
public debt issues.
305
 Problematically, under EU State Aid Rules a precautionary 
recapitalisation is not designed to cleanse balance sheets of NPLs. 
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An effective and efficient approach utilises private sector AMCs, operating under market 
forces, that do not expose taxpayers to potential losses. KKR Credit launched an AMC called 
Pillarstone Italy in October 2015. Pillarstone has two functions, NPL resolution and corporate 
restructuring.
306
 Intesa and UniCredit, two large SIBs, received almost all of the initial NPL 
recovery, before a higher proportion accrues to Pillarstone.
307
 HIG Bayside Capital has 
established an AMC to buy NPLs in exchange for its AMC equity.
308
  
Pillarstone took on the debts of five companies including paper maker Burgo and Lediberg, 
theme park manager Alfa Park, telecommunications group Sirti, and the shipping company 
Premuda.
309
 An agreement was reached with Permuda whereby Pillarstone would inject new 
equity, taking a 50% ownership stake in exchange for absorbing €250 million NPLs.310 
Pillarstone has equity positions in distressed Italian companies totalling over €1 billion and 
its Chief Executive estimates that Pillarstone’s potential market could surpass €20 billion 
within three years.
311
  
D. Greece 
Greece experienced widening budget and trade deficits since its accession to the Eurozone in 
the early 2000s due to structural weaknesses and widespread tax evasion. Increasing debt 
flows resulted in the economy posting high growth rates during this period. Doubts 
concerning the sustainability of Greek debt arose in the second half of 2009 as the economy 
entered recession and a sovereign debt crisis unfolded.  Investors began to lose confidence in 
Greece’s ability to service its bonds. Between 2009 and 2015, Greek GDP declined by 26% 
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and unemployment reached 27% in 2014.
312
 In April 2010 the Greek government requested 
an IMF/EU bail-out.  
Conditions of the €110 billion package included reining in fiscal spending, structural reforms 
to rebalance the economy, and stabilising the banking system by inter alia, establishing the 
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF)—a private entity. Banks maintained liquidity and 
capital from support by the HFSF and ECB Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). These 
arrangements assisted in bank reconstructions, providing loans for resolutions, and managing 
NPLs.
313
  
In 2007, NPLs were 4.6% rising to 9.1% in 2010, before surging to 31.9% in 2013.
314
 By 
2013, 12 banks had been placed into liquidation or resolved.
315
 Nonetheless NPLs were 
retained on balance sheet as a distressed debt legal framework only became operational in 
November 2015. NPEs increased to 43.6% by September 2015 up from 39.9% in 2014.
316
 In 
March 2016 the NPL ratio was 47%, the second highest in the EU.
317
 
A number of weaknesses in Greece’s distressed asset legal framework have been identified 
by the HFSF. Judicial impediments include judges lacking debt restructuring experience, 
procedural delays to hear cases, an inflexible insolvency code, and no out-of-court 
restructuring and settlement mechanism.
318
 The 2016 NPL law has fixed some of these flaws 
but it still contains inadequate transfer mechanisms, namely: (i) the securitisation law 
excludes NPL transfers; (ii) debtor notice is costly, time consuming, and may require 
consent; (iii) uncertain NPL tax arrangements involving VAT and stamp duty; (iv) may 
expose the transferor to liability for breach of fiduciary duty if consideration is inadequate; 
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(v) certain security transfers may not be automatic; and (vi) the transferee may be liable for a 
NPL balance levy.
319
 
Weaknesses in transfer servicing include: (i) no exemption from data privacy rules; (ii) the 
definition of servicers as suppliers creates uncertainty; (iii) servicers are required to take 
special care of socially sensitive groups which creates uncertainties; (iv) servicers are 
subjected to the Notification Company Law; and (v) certain transferees may not have 
collection and enforcement privileges.
320
 
Inadequate enforcement procedures include: (i) executory title in forced sales following an 
application to vacate when assets are attached or foreclosed; (ii) lacking incentives for out-of-
court settlements; (iii) NPL oversupply leading to inadequate returns for secured creditors; 
(iv) requires procedural homogenisation and cost reductions; and (v) questionable 
effectiveness and delays.
 321
 
On 17 May 2016 following the recapitalisations of two of the largest banks, Alpha Bank and 
Eurobank, KKR Credit reached an agreement to assign and manage credit and equity 
exposures in an AMC managed by KKR Credit’s Pillarstone.322 KKR is utilising a similar 
AMC platform as in Italy.
323
 However, unlike Pillarstone Italy, Pillarstone Greece may 
receive a €50 million injection from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) which will also provide corporate governance advice to distressed Greek 
companies.
324
 The EBRD is already a shareholder in Greece’s four big banks, investing €250 
million.
325
 Non-bank NPL services and acquirer licensing is supervised by the Bank of 
                                                          
319
 Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, ‘Updated Analysis of Non-Regulatory Constraints & Impediments for the 
development of the NPL market in Greece’, (September 2016), 21 to 22. 
320
 Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, ‘Updated Analysis of Non-Regulatory Constraints & Impediments for the 
development of the NPL market in Greece’, (September 2016), 22 to 23. 
321
 Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, ‘Updated Analysis of Non-Regulatory Constraints & Impediments for the 
development of the NPL market in Greece’, (September 2016), 18 to 21. 
322
 KKR, ‘Alpha Bank, Eurobank and KKR Reach Agreement to Support Greek Companies’, (17 May 2016) 
Media Centre: available at 
http://www.media.kkr.com/media/media_releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=971220&utm_source=Public%20Affairs
&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_term=Pillarstone%20Agreement&utm_campaign=Press%20Release (visited on 
26 October 2016). 
323
 Dominic O’Neill, ‘Greece hosts KKR scheme as NPL market opens’, (June 2016) Euromoney: available at 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3560042/Greece-hosts-KKR-scheme-as-NPL-market-opens.html (visited on 
26 October 2016). 
324
 Dominic O’Neill, ‘Greece hosts KKR scheme as NPL market opens’, (June 2016) Euromoney: available at 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3560042/Greece-hosts-KKR-scheme-as-NPL-market-opens.html (visited on 
27 October 2016). 
325
 Dominic O’Neill, ‘Greece hosts KKR scheme as NPL market opens’, (June 2016) Euromoney: available at 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3560042/Greece-hosts-KKR-scheme-as-NPL-market-opens.html (visited on 
27 October 2016). 
52 
 
Greece, the NPL regulator. Licenses have been sought by Alpha Bank, Eurobank, KKR 
Credit, and a large law firm.
326
 Bank NPL sales will begin in 2017.
327
  
E. Analysis and Evaluation 
The EU/IMF bail-out programmes prescribe, inter alia, banking sector consolidation, 
solvency improvement, and balance sheet cleansing. Consolidation involves mergers and 
downsizing rather than closures, solvency improvement is through capital injections, and 
balance sheet cleansing is distressed asset cleansing. This restructuring approach focuses on 
distressed asset cleansing, in particular the use of AMCs.  
Ireland and Spain merged and nationalised (i.e., recapitalised) banks prior to establishing 
AMCs. A large bank was liquidated in Ireland after a forced merger failed. Closure and 
liquidation is viewed as a last resort in contrast to the IMF approach in the Asian crisis. 
Capital injections, similar to those in other systemic banking crises, have been critical in 
maintaining bank solvency and stability. 
Bank capital adequacy ratios under the Basel II framework for Ireland, Italy, and Spain were 
above 10% in 2007.
328
 Greece’s capital adequacy ratio was also above 10%, although Basel II 
had not been implemented.
329
 When the property markets in Spain and Ireland collapsed, 
NPL ratios rose significantly, mirroring those of Thailand and Indonesia in the Asian crisis. 
The surge in NPLs during the European and Asian banking crises highlighted that satisfying 
international standards, for example capital adequacy ratios, does not necessarily reflect 
banking system strength. 
The 2006 NPL ratios in Spain and Ireland were less than 1%
330
 because of the 2005 adoption 
of ‘incurred loss’ instead of ‘expected loss’ accounting standards and securitisation which 
allowed banks to reduce loss provisioning.
331
 Italy, which used the same standard, had an 
NPL ratio of 6.6% in 2006, higher than South Korea and Malaysia, but significantly lower 
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than Indonesia and Thailand.
 332
 This is alarming considering that this accounting standard 
understates NPLs. For this reason, incurred loss accounting should be avoided. 
Ireland took the initiative to establish an AMC prior to its EU/IMF bail-out, similar to the 
approach adopted by Malaysia in the late 1990s, which has been successful in stabilising the 
banking system. Italy has not taken an EU/IMF bail-out, yet accepts that its banks need 
restructuring, in particular NPL cleansing. The EU BRRD obliges Italy to establish a 
government-owned AMC. This obligation is not fulfilled because of ongoing domestic 
political issues. In contrast Spain has established an AMC, being an EU bail-out condition. 
Greece is relying on private sector AMCs to satisfy its EU bail-out conditions but no real 
progress has been made. Restructuring programmes in Ireland, Italy and Spain do not transfer 
NPLs at an effective level nor do they mitigate taxpayer losses. 
After successive bank recapitalisations and the promulgation of NPL laws to facilitate AMC 
transfers, Greece and Italy have reached agreements with private sector AMCs. Delays in 
promulgating legal frameworks to facilitate NPL transfers due to political deliberations are 
destabilising the Greek and Italian banking systems. Recurrent delays to effectively deal with 
high NPL ratios on bank balance sheets intensify both the problem of bank solvency and 
illiquidity in the economy perpetuating the vicious cycle of recession, illiquidity, and debt 
overhang discussed in Part II.  
In the Asian and European banking crises the legal frameworks were chronically 
underdeveloped prior to the onset of systemic banking problems. New laws are required to 
establish AMCs and effect NPL transfers off-balance sheet. Successful distressed asset 
markets are also characterised by short legal processes.
333
  
However, promulgating legislation alone is not sufficient as viable AMCs require functional 
distressed asset markets. The greatest obstacles to bank restructuring are ineffective NPL 
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legislation and underdeveloped distressed asset markets.
334
 Evidence suggests that domestic 
markets for distressed assets grow in tandem with the level of NPLs and viable AMCs.
335
  
The EU market for distressed debt is quite illiquid for structural reasons yet obstacles are 
higher, for legal and cultural reasons, in Greece, Italy and Spain. Distressed asset markets in 
Spain are concentrated in commercial real estate, limiting NPL dispersion,
336
 with a 
legislative obstacle under Catalonian law discouraging AMC NPL purchases. Eliminating or 
diminishing the profit incentive from NPL purchases is a disincentive for AMCs to 
participate in distressed asset markets. 
Bond issues fund AMC NPL purchases in Ireland and Spain but the ownership structure and 
raison d’etre of the two schemes is quite different. Ireland’s AMC is 100% government 
owned, exposing taxpayers to unlimited liability. This may explain its statutory purpose of 
paying-down debt. In contrast, Spain’s AMC is partially privatised (i.e., 55%), with Spanish 
taxpayers exposed to its 45% equity share, with senior debt issued by the AMC to fund NPL 
purchases. Perpetual subordinated debt is not guaranteed by the government. Italy guarantees 
NPL securitisation transactions, involving senior note issues which are supported by 
unguaranteed junior notes issued to at least 50% of investors. Therefore, Italy’s maximum 
liability is 50% of note issues. Italy’s guarantee assists banks to transfer NPLs for a higher 
price rather than supporting AMCs to purchase NPLs. This may not result in expeditious 
NPL transfers. Guarantees require calibration to balance the competing incentives of NPL 
transfers off-balance sheet and AMC NPL purchases. Spain’s Banco Popular request for a 
€2.5 billion capital injection in May 2016 demonstrates why expeditious NPL transfers are 
critical. In Greece most NPLs are not subject to a state guarantee. Greek banks which hold 
the bulk of NPLs have however received large capital injections.  
The exit plan of Ireland’s AMC is based on paying down its bond debt. This equates to nine 
years of operation before realising a profit. Spain’s AMC has a lifespan of 15 years to 
liquidate NPLs and there is uncertainty whether a profit will ever be realised.  Once both 
AMCs are decommissioned, it is doubtful whether bank NPL ratios will be at viable levels. 
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Italy’s and Greece’s private AMCs face two hurdles—deficient legislation and undeveloped 
distressed asset markets—before a substantial reduction in NPL ratios is feasible.  
The use of private sector AMCs in Italy is proving to be profitable and effective with strong 
forecasts for market growth. This balance sheet restructuring approach is preferred over state-
owned AMCs because taxpayer liability is limited.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The IMF’s approach to banking crises has evolved from closing down banks to aligning with 
the FSB Key Attributes—restructuring banks by strengthening bank balance sheets with the 
use of AMCs. This resolution approach pursues an orderly banking system restructuring that 
ensures the continuity of vital economic functions while mitigating taxpayer exposure. 
Evidence from the three major banking crises of the past two decades supports the 
participation of public funds where the rescue programme focuses on restructuring balance 
sheets rather than bank closures, particularly in the context of SIBs. When the threat of a 
banking crisis or when a surge in NPLs is identified, pre-emptive and operational 
restructuring actions have been more effective in mitigating banking system instability. 
Reluctance or hesitation to implement reforms can intensify banking crises and undermine 
long-term solvency.  
Robust capital, leverage, and liquidity buffers minimise bank failures. However, regulators 
can misjudge the strength of the banking system by merely relying on compliance with 
international capital adequacy standards. Moreover banks that are fully compliant ex ante 
with international regulatory standards can experience a rapid deterioration of their capital 
position from exogenous and endogenous factors, namely adverse macroeconomic 
developments or contagion from a financial crisis. Therefore, when capital buffers are under 
stress and private funding is unavailable, the government should be allowed to make a 
marginal capital injection for systemic or macroeconomic reasons into a viable yet failing  
bank to instil market confidence. When a bank is under severe stress from systemic and 
macroeconomic factors, the argument against public support for fear of giving rise to moral 
hazard is fundamentally untenable. In a limited number of cases state injections of capital 
will result in the state taking an ownership position in a systemic bank, which may also be 
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necessary to restore confidence. Nonetheless, competition in the market system should be 
maintained and directed lending avoided whenever possible. 
Banks need to be equipped with the tools to manage balance sheets promptly, to avoid 
distressed assets destabilising banks and banking system confidence. Bail-in tools can 
provide additional capital which strengthens bank balance sheets by converting creditor 
claims to equity when there is no danger of contagion, especially where the key factor for the 
failure of the bank is idiosyncratic—for example, fraud. In a financial crisis, an anti-bail-out 
bias can cause the collapse of credit markets and the banking system. A consistent bail-out 
approach, including cross-border cooperation, instils confidence and stability in a banking 
system.  
Accounting treatments should avoid fair value accounting and expected loss accounting 
which underestimates banking system vulnerability. ECL and accounting treatments which 
harmonise with the NPE definition provide a more accurate financial position.  
Transferring distressed assets off-balance sheet necessitates the use of AMCs. AMCs are 
effective at strengthening banks’ capital base without the need for additional capital 
injections and are capable of controlling the timing of distressed asset sales until more 
favourable market conditions prevail. Using private-sector AMCs (though perhaps 
government invested), in contrast to government bail-outs, is advantageous since the level of 
government-ownership and taxpayer liability is significantly lower. In contrast, public-sector 
AMCs can expose the government to unlimited liability, burdening the taxpayer. The key 
problem with AMCs is asset valuations. From an accounting perspective, NPL bad debts are 
considered uncollectable. Thus, the chances of AMC profitability are low unless bad debts 
are bought at a steep discount. This would benefit the AMC at the expense of the bank. 
However, the guarantee places liability on the government for the bank’s benefit. Therefore, a 
public AMC is unlikely to satisfy the objective of ensuring the most efficient use of public 
resources, although in the long-run this may prove to be a more efficient solution than other 
bail-out options. 
Government guarantees may prove critical to the initial stability of a banking system. Large 
exposures to NPL linked financial instruments can complicate the establishment of AMCs to 
sequester banks from distressed assets. If this is the case, then retaining distressed assets on-
balance sheet supported by government guarantees will be the preferred option. Government 
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guarantees that retain distressed assets on-balance sheet can lack control over the timing of 
sales, exposing governments to substantive liability and extensive capital injections. 
Guarantees should only be used when banks can be returned to viability within a short-time 
horizon.  
Debt restructuring requires legislative frameworks and infrastructure. If NPL legislation or 
infrastructure is absent, a programme should be designed expeditiously, ideally ex ante. 
Delays in promulgating legal support or infrastructure destabilises banking systems by 
maintaining and possibly intensifying high NPL ratios on-balance sheet. A public authority 
must be designated to co-ordinate the management of the NPL programme. It is advisable 
that regulators adopt a broad and uniform definition of NPLs or NPEs, for example the BCBS 
definition of NPEs, to capture the greatest range of distressed assets. 
Effective and expeditious NPL transfers depend on passing NPL legislation that builds 
suitable bankruptcy, arbitration, and civil procedures. These requirements should not depress 
NPL values or distressed asset markets. Legal infrastructure should enable all banks 
regardless of size to participate in the restructuring programme. AMCs require a capacity to 
manage a wide range of distressed assets to ensure that bank participation is maximised. 
To incentivise NPL transfers, government guarantees can be placed on NPL sales to private 
AMCs and/or AMC bond issues. NPL transfer efficiency is heightened in a market-based 
system because government guarantees require calibration to balance the competing 
incentives of transferring NPLs off-balance sheet and minimising losses from AMC NPL 
purchases. As guarantees expose taxpayers to liability and potentially increase the cost of a 
programme, fees can be charged to offset these costs. 
An AMC must be capable of maximising discretionary NPL sales. Ideally NPLs are sold 
when market conditions yield profit and an efficient transfer. Successful NPL sales require a 
developed distressed asset market. In turn successful distressed asset markets require short 
legal processes. If the market is underdeveloped or obstructed, the government needs to 
remove legal and regulatory obstacles, and design policies to create investment incentives. In 
general, legal and regulatory obstacles are those that penalise or act as a disincentive for NPL 
transfers and purchasers and the development of a liquid secondary market for distressed 
debt. The optimum market-based restructuring solution for NPLs utilises private sector 
AMCs and requires a tax regime that promotes distressed asset markets. It also needs to be 
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premised on a legal system that ensures the efficient and effective transfer of NPLs and 
enforces distressed asset liability. 
Assuming the fulfilment of the above conditions, the use of AMCs is instrumental in 
cleansing bank balance sheets of NPLs, strengthening capital ratios in the longer-term and 
enhancing banks’ capacity to re-start lending. Especially where the majority of funding is 
sourced from bond issues (i.e. the private sector), this acts as a counter-cyclical relief 
mechanism, which can promptly abate the triggering or further deterioration of a banking 
crisis from a surge in NPLs, while mitigating taxpayer expenditure. This is a very important 
lesson both for the economies in the periphery of the Eurozone and policy planners in other 
parts of the globe that may face an NPL crisis in future. Experience from past crises suggests 
that in tackling NPLs and bank restructurings, regulatory thinking ought to shift towards an 
efficiency and effectiveness approach rather than one that magnifies the importance of moral 
hazard. The role of the latter should not be overestimated where the causes of the crisis are 
systemic. 
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policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish 
Dynamic Provisioning Experiments’, (June 2012) Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper no 628. 
Thomas Jordan, ‘Challenges for the SNB in extraordinary times- remarks made by the 
Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank’, (2009) Bank for International Settlements, 
BIS Review 77/2009. 
Dongsoo Kang, ‘Key Success Factors on the Revitalization of Distressed Firms: A Case of 
the Korean Workouts,’ (February 2004) Korea Development Institute. 
Anil K. Kashyap, Owen A. Lamont, and Jeremy C. Stein, ‘Credit Conditions and the Cyclical 
Behavior of Inventories’, (1994) 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics 3. 
Kim Kihwan, ‘The 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis: Causes, Policy Response, and Lessons’, 
(July 2006) High-Level Seminar on Crisis Prevention in Emerging Markets, International 
Monetary Fund and the Government of Singapore. 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore, ‘Credit Cycles’, (April 1997) 105 Journal of Political 
Economy 2. 
69 
 
KKR, ‘Alpha Bank, Eurobank and KKR Reach Agreement to Support Greek Companies’, 
(17 May 2016) Media Centre: available at 
http://www.media.kkr.com/media/media_releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=971220&utm_source
=Public%20Affairs&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_term=Pillarstone%20Agreement&utm_ca
mpaign=Press%20Release (visited on 26 October 2016). 
Nir Klein, ‘Nonperforming Loans in CESEE: Determinants and Impact on Macroeconomic 
Performance’, (March 2013) IMF Working Paper, WP/13/72.  
Marc Labonte, ‘Federal Reserve: Emergency Lending’, (January 2016) Congressional 
Research Service. 
Francesca Landini and Massimo Gaia, ‘KKR unit takes on Italian shipping company debt 
from banks’, (22 April 2016) Reuters, Hot Stocks. 
Zan Li, Shisheng Qu, and Jing Zhang, ‘Quantifying the Value of Implicit Government 
Guarantees for Large Financial Institutions’, (2011) Moody’s Analytics Quantitative 
Research Group. 
Carl-Johan Lindgren, Tomás J.T. Balino, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Gulde, Marc Quintyn, 
and Leslie Teo, ‘Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia’, (1999) 
International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 188. 
David Lipton, IMF First Deputy Managing Director speaking at: ‘Rebalancing China: 
International Lessons in Corporate Debt’, (11 June 2016) IMF China Economic Society 
Conference On Sustainable Development in China and the World. 
Qiao Liu, Paul Lejot, and Douglas Arner, Finance in Asia: Institutions, Regulation and 
Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
Guonan Ma, ‘Who pays China’s bank restructuring bill?’, (2006) Centre D’Ethudes 
Prospectives Et D’Inforations Internationales.. 
Guonan Ma and Ben SC Fung, ‘China’s asset management corporations’, (August 2002) BIS 
Working Papers No 115. 
70 
 
Luis Brandao Marques, Ricardo Correa, and Horacio Sapriza, ‘International Evidence on 
Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector’, (2013) IMF Working Paper, 
WP/13/94. 
 
Gavin McLean, ‘Breaking bad: Tackling European NPLs’, (26 September 2016) White & 
Case: available at http://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/breaking-bad-tackling-
european-npls (visited on 27 October 2016). 
Hyman P. Minsky, ‘Financial Instability Revisited: The Economics of Disaster— 
Fundamental Reappraisal of the Discount Mechanism’, (1970) Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Hyman P. Minsky, ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’, (1992) Levy Economics Institute of 
Bard College Working Paper No. 74.  
Philip Molyneux, ‘Will Italy’s failing banks trigger financial collapse across Europe?’, (28 
November 2016) The Guardian: available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/28/italy-failing-banks-new-japan 
(visited on 7 March 2017). 
Moody’s, ‘Catalonian law on housing emergencies may deter buyers of non-performing loan 
pools’, (February 2016) Global Credit Research: available at 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Catalonian-law-on-housing-emergencies-may-
deter-buyers-of--
PR_343077?WT.mc_id=AMRmluYW56ZW4ubmVOX1JTQI9SYXRpbmdzX05ld3NfTm9
fVHJhbnNsYXRpb25z20160131_PR_343077 (visited on 13 February 2016). 
Moody’s Investors Service, ‘Moody’s Negative outlook on China’s banking system driven by 
challenging operating environment and deteriorating asset quality and profitability’, (31 May 
2016): available at https://www.moods.com/research/Moodys-Negative-outlook-on-Chinas-
banking-system-driven-by-challenging--PR_349828 (visited on 26 October 2016). 
Moody’s Investor Services, ‘The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc – Substantial 
Restructuring Progress Underpins Our Positive Outlook’, (January 2016): available at 
http://www.investors.rbs.com//media/Files/R/RBS-IR/credit-
ratings/moody/2016%2001%2011%20Moodys%20on%20RBS%20-
71 
 
%”)Substantial%20Restructuring%20Progress%20Underpins%20Our%20Positive%20Outlo
ok.pdf (visited on 15 November 2016). 
Donald P. Morgan and Kevin J. Stiroh, ‘Too Big To Fail after All These Years’, (September 
2005) Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, Staff Report no. 220. 
NAMA, ‘2015 End of Year Review’, (5 January 2016) Press Statement: available at 
https://www.nama.ie/about-us/news-detailed-view/news/nama-2015-end-of-year-review-1/ 
(visited on February 2016). 
NAMA, ‘Section 227 Review’, (July 2014). 
National Audit Office, ‘HM Treasury, The Asset Protection Scheme’, (21 December 2010) 
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 567, Session 2010-2011. 
Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, ‘Statement by the Hon. Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, Governor of 
the Bank for Thailand, at the Joint Annual Discussion’, (October 1998) International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank Group, Press Release No. 26. 
Mwanza Nkusu, ‘Nonperforming Loans and Macrofinancial Vulnerabilities in Advanced 
Economies’, (2011) IMF Working Paper, WP/11/161. 
OECD, ‘Insolvency Systems in Asia: An Efficiency Perspective’, (2001) Finance and 
Investment. 
OECD, ‘OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland’, (2011). 
Dominic O’Neill, ‘Greece hosts KKR scheme as NPL market opens’, (June 2016) 
Euromoney: available at http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3560042/Greece-hosts-KKR-
scheme-as-NPL-market-opens.html (visited on 26 October 2016). 
Dominic O’Neill, ‘Restructuring: KKR launches Pillarstone for European NPLs,’ (October 
2015) Euromoney. 
Ananthakrishnan Prasad and Raphael A. Espinoza, ‘Nonperforming Loans in the GCC 
Banking System and their Macroeconomic Effects’, (2010) IMF Working Paper, WP/10/224. 
Alberto Quarati, ‘Milan Stock Exchange: deal with Pillarstone lifts Premuda shares’, (23 
April 2016) The Medi Telegraph: available at 
72 
 
http://www.themeditelgraph.com/en/shipping/shipowners/2016/04/23/milan-stock-exchange-
deal-with-pillarstone-lifts-premuda-shares-SBSLE6pawMaK9My3Jct0kM/index.html 
(visited on 27 October 2016). 
Raghuram G. Rajan and  Luigi Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’, (1998) 88 The 
American Economic Review 3. 
Liu Ran and Wu Hongyuran (rewritten by Han Wei), ‘Carving up the Non-performing Loan 
Elephant’, (2016) CaixinOnline: available at http://www.english.caixin.com/2016-08-
08/100975319.html (visited on 9 November 2016). 
Reuters, ‘Fitch: Italy Bridge Banks Sale Highlights Post-Resolution costs,’ (20 January 
2017). 
Rothschild, ‘The UK investment in Royal Bank of Scotland’, (10 June 2015) Rothschild 
Report. 
Joao A. C. Santos, ‘Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-To-Fail” Subsidy’, 
(December 2014) 20 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 29. 
Sareb, ‘Half Year Report. H1 2013’. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘UBS AG Form 6-K’, (1 October 2007) Report on 
Foreign Issuer, Washington. 
Stephen Sherlock, ‘Crisis in Indonesia: Economy, Society and Politics’, (April 1998) 
Parliament of Australia, Current Issues Brief 13 1997-98: available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98cib13 (visited on 8 November 2016). 
South China Morning Post, ‘Bad loans to grow as disposal becomes harder, says chairman of 
China’s biggest ‘bad bank’’, (31 August 2016). 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, ‘Extraordinary Financial 
Assistance Provided to Citigroup, Inc.’, (13 January 2011) SIGTARP 11-002. 
73 
 
Yannis Stournaras, Bank of Greece Governor at the 83
rd
 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: 
‘The Completion of the Review is Essential for an Exit from the Crisis’, (February 2016) 
Speech. 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission, ‘Subprime Crisis: SFBC Investigation into the Causes 
of the Write-downs of UBS AG’, (September 2008). 
SNB, ‘SNB purchases StabFund from SNB’, (8 November 2013) Press Release. 
SNB, ‘SNB StabFund repays Swiss National Bank loan’, (16 August 2013) Press Release. 
SNB, ‘SNB’s special purpose vehicle for UBS assets to be domiciled in Switzerland’, (26 
November 2008) Press Release. 
The Economist, ‘Bargain hunt,’ (20 August 2016): available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21705341-structural-obstacles-
make-italian-banks-bad-loans-hard-sell-bargain-hunt (visited on 27 October 2016). 
The Economist, ‘Botox shot: Injections of capital may soon wear off’, (8 January 2004) 
Recapitalising China’s Banks, Hong Kong: available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/2338716 (visited on 14 January 2016). 
Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, ‘Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for 
systemically Important Financial Institutions’, (2011) IMF Working Paper WP/12/128. 
UKFI, ‘UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’, 
(July 2016). 
UKFI, ‘UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) Update on UKFI Market Investments 
March 2010’. 
Rolf Weber, Douglas Arner, Evan Gibson and Simone Baumann, “Addressing Systemic Risk: 
Financial Regulatory Design”, (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 149. 
Anke Weber, Emanuel Kopp, and Jose Garrido, ‘Cleaning-up Bank Balance Sheets : 
Economic, Legal, and Supervisory Measures for Italy’, (July 2016) IMF Working Paper, 
WP/16/135. 
74 
 
Phillip R. Wood, Project Finance, Securitisations, Subordinated Debt, Volume 5 (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 2007). 
World Bank, ‘Bank Loan Classification and Provisioning Practices in Selected Developed 
and Emerging Countries’, (2002) A Survey of Current Practices in Countries Represented on 
the Basel Core Principles Liaison Group. 
World Bank, ‘Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans’, data: available at 
http://www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS?page=2 (visited on 13 
November 2016). 
World Bank, ‘Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)’,: available at 
http://www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG (visited on 13 November 
2016). 
World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund, European Investment Bank, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Central Bank, and European 
Commission, ‘European Banking Coordination “Vienna Initiative” - Working Group on 
NPLs in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe’, (March 2012). 
Lai Xiaomin, Chairman of China Huarong Asset Management in: ‘Bad loans to grow as 
disposal becomes harder, says chairman of China’s biggest ‘bad bank’’, (31 August 2016) 
South China Morning Post. 
Ye Xie, ‘China Has a $590 Billion Problem With Unpaid Bills’, (20 March 2016) Bloomberg 
Markets. 
Yuan Yang, ‘Chinese banks begin raising capital for debt-for-equity swaps’, (25 October 
2016) Financial Times, China Business. 
Yuan Yang and Gabriel Wildau, ‘Chinese banks disguise risky loans as ‘investments’’, (29 
April 2016) Financial Times, Shadow Banking. 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
